Note: This article is an excerpt from a published book.
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Over the past few decades, Western countries have been deploying overseas military bases with the goal of creating global influence. However, this has caused some conflicts among nations, creating a variety of international disputes. In response, rather than following the Western route, China has made a policy choice to provide “strategic seaports” to the world as “global commons,” aiming to bolster peace and economic wellbeing for the international community.
As explained in Mahan’s “Sea Power Theory,” a country’s sea power is instrumental in that country’s military and economic value of maritime benefits. Strategic seaports, as explained by the U.S. Department of Defense, are designated because of “their ability to support major force and materiel deployments in times of war and national emergency.” Given their pivotal role in international ocean transportation, as I argued in 2018, strategic seaports could be regarded as global commons by focusing on their global scale and shared nature. This includes actively participating in the establishment of a new pattern of ocean rights and interests, as well as a new influence on the global economy. The goal is to avoid being involved in military struggles and vicious competition for ocean rights and interests. While private capital plays an important role in seaport construction and operations, it is important to note that governments are the main builders and providers of seaport infrastructure.
The proposal of strategic seaport as global commons has been underscored under the framework of “The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road.” China has been willing to provide relevant economic, technical, personnel, and other aspects to support maritime countries to build ports. The goal is to build a “One Belt, One Road Strategic Port” that promotes the development of the ocean economy and facilitates international trade between China and the countries along the route. According to Chinese official statistics, as of June 2023, 152 countries have signed “Belt and Road” cooperation documents with China. China’s trade volume with these countries has increased from $1 trillion USD to $2 trillion USD from 2013 to 2023. China has invested in more than 3,000 projects in these countries, with non-financial investments reaching 785.9 billion yuan, most of which have been transformed into local ports, railways, bridges, and industrial parks.
Under the view of treating strategic seaports as global commons, building an effective legal system and implementation plan is key. China and relevant countries and private entities have signed strategic cooperation agreements. At the national level, some crucial principles of the agreements include respecting state sovereignty, sustainable security, territorial integrity as enshrined, and the foundation of mutual benefit and mutual demands. Also included are a chain of institutional agreements stipulating the parties’ services, legal rights, duties, and liabilities, and dispute resolution methods. There are multilateral treaties, bilateral agreements, and other legal documents that illustrate the preceding arguments. When dealing with private entities, it is crucial to consider important principles, content, direction, and methods for resolving disputes in cooperation, all while adhering to relevant laws and regulations.
China builds overseas strategic ports with the aim of creating overseas strategic pivots. This involves actively managing maritime security, such as addressing rampant piracy and safeguarding international ocean rights and interests. These actions are conducted based on rules outlined by the United Nations with the authorization of the respective governments of the countries involved.
By using strategic seaports as strategic pivots, China not only maintains global commons in the countries where the strategic ports are located but also preserves a variety of global commons relevant to the international community. Such global commons are multi-dimensional and may include: ocean trade, ocean transportation, and economic development; ocean investment; ocean scientific expeditions; maritime disaster rescue; maritime disasters, disaster relief, maritime searching, and rescue, combating piracy, combating smuggling, drug trafficking, terrorism and other crimes; maritime peacekeeping force supplies; and ship maintenance bases.
An example of China’s approach to strategic ports as global commons can be found in the “Port Leasing Agreement” between China and Djibouti, where they reached an economic assistance and security cooperation agreement. China provided more than $1 billion USD in low interest loans to support Djibouti in achieving its economic transformation. The port of Djibouti is located at the entrance of the Mande Strait, which serves as the gateway to the Suez Canal. It holds the position at the southern entrance connecting the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea, known as the “Horn of Africa.” China not only engages in economic assistance, but also uses this port as an important strategic supply point, playing an active role in combating piracy and maintaining ocean order and security. This can be viewed as an example of the ocean public security commons preserved by China.
To sum up, under the framework of the One Belt, One Road initiative, China has actively helped maintain the preservation of various global commons for maritime countries and the international community by creating strategic seaports. Countries around the world are negotiating projects with China. In the past, China had a minimal presence on the global stage. However, nowadays, China’s influence and presence are noticeably prominent. This endeavor not only promotes economic exchange and people-to-people communication among nations, but also advances international ocean transportation safety and economic development.
You can read more in my book: “Construction of China’s Overseas Strategic Pivot: Legal Path and Choice Strategy” (November 1, 2018).
Author: Jimmy Fan (Jinlin Fan)
LLM Candidate, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. PhD, Shanghai Jiao Tong University. Adjunct professor and lawyer in Shanghai, China.
