Russia—through arms trade, financial resource assistance, and war—establishes itself as a power maintaining control in its region. However, complete stability continues to escape the Kremlin due to frozen conflict zones, intra-state regions struggling to attain independence. Formed after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), frozen conflict zones endure in an atmosphere eschewing direct war; but, lacking peace as well. These areas include Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia challenges the sovereignty of Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, respectively. Russian power in these areas remains mostly unchallenged by the international community. This is explained by the dominance of Russia within the intergovernmental organization (IGO) network. Although Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain concretely within Moscow’s grip, Turkey, Iran, and Georgia continue to combat Russian ambitions in Nagorno-Karabakh.
METHODOLOGY
I used previous writings in International Relations Theory, foreign-language resources, research documents, and data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and RAND Corporation to conduct analysis of frozen conflict regions and the role Russia plays.
SYSTEM EFFECTS AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES
Contingency effects are outcomes that are predicated on a multitude of interactions and are not inevitable. The rise of Russia was non-inevitable, especially given its weakened status during the mid-1990s. Contingency effects in the form of interactions between nations in intergovernmental organizations explain for Russia’s triumphant return to the world stage. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) represents the main intergovernmental organization (IGO) in the area. It often succumbs to Russian interests. One such area is the ineffectiveness of the Minsk Group, a peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh. Leadership of the Minsk Group includes personnel from the United States, France, and Russia. The Kremlin maintains a seat at the decision-making table in the Minsk Group, because it presents itself as the only solution to these regional problems and the other powers cooperate on Russia’s terms. Thus, Russia is able to control the actions of an important arm of the OSCE, preventing harmful retaliation against its own efforts in the region.
Interaction effects are those which occur from events that change the landscape of an issue. For example, Russia’s invasion and war with Georgia altered the strategies of other states engaged in the South Caucasus. The Russo-Georgian War signaled to regional entities that Moscow was willing to wage war to gain territory and power. Abkhazia and South Ossetia promised troops to the Russian cause pursuing the carrot of independence Russia dangled before them. Such outright violence promised a more cautious approach in the area by foreign powers. In 2008, Russia waged war on Georgia, with the help of military personnel from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Afterwards, as illustrated in the table above, rather than combating Russian aggression, the OSCE bowed to Russian dominance, ceasing mission efforts in Georgia.
EQUILIBRIUM AND STATE ACTORS IN FROZEN CONFLICT ZONES
While the OSCE’s efforts fall flat, area states continue to push back against Russian influence in their neighborhood. Equilibrium Theory—the notion of analyzing states’ military-political and socioeconomic capabilities as a central function of their combined ability to balance an aggressor—explains this behavior. When states are unwilling or unable to counterbalance an aggressor’s actions, equilibrium, a status quo, persists. Equilibrium exists in the South Caucasus frozen conflict zones, considering their almost thirty-year lifespans.
The conflicts of Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain in equilibrium due to Moldovan and Georgian inability to alter the system by combatting Russia through military-political or socioeconomic capabilities; in Nagorno-Karabakh, however certain states push against Russia, engendering a complex equilibrium in which Russia is not the sole authority. Turkey, Iran, and Georgia represent the greatest threats to Russian ambitions in the South Caucasus.
Russia funds resources, including arms and finances to both Azerbaijan and Armenia, hedging its bets regardless of who attains control of frozen conflict zone between them, Nagorno-Karabakh. Although Armenia prefers Russian power, Azerbaijan allies itself more closely with Turkey, Iran, and Georgia. As a result, the latter states retain enough influence in Azerbaijan to deter Russian ambitions and aid Azerbaijan in acquiring Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey and Iran share historical-cultural backgrounds with Azerbaijan and contribute to it through both military-political and socioeconomic tactics including arms trade and investment. In addition to arms trade, Turkey and Georgia continue to develop pipelines and railways through their countries that originate in Azerbaijan. These connections create a socioeconomic counterbalance to Russian attempts. However, Turkey and Georgia do not provide quite enough military-political nor socioeconomic help to completely prevent Russian influence from spreading; but they restrain it to a minimum.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
System Effects Theory and Equilibrium Theory are frameworks which explain the rise of and subsequent control wielded by Russia. Moving forward, three conclusions become clear:
1. Focus Russian-power balancing diplomacy efforts on Nagorno-Karabakh
2. Challenge Russia’s power of the purse
3. Recognize frozen conflict zone independence with conditions
Because Nagorno-Karabakh is primarily a conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russian sway is not as prominent as in the other frozen conflict regions. Powers seeking to upend Russian dominance should focus their energy on diplomatic efforts that bring Armenia and Azerbaijan to the negotiation table, as their distance encourages Russian intervention and hedging.
Russia’s gross domestic product last year was approximately $1,283,163 USD. This is almost equivalent to Turkey’s, Iran’s, and Georgia’s GDPs combined. Challenging the economic prowess of Russia is therefore important. To counteract Russian donations to Azerbaijan and Armenia, other states in the international system ought to provide more economic resources.
Finally, recognizing the independence of frozen conflict regions would go a long way to coercing their cooperation. However, these areas persist within established states, and their independence threatens sovereignty. Therefore, a conditional independence in the frozen conflict zone would be arranged; decisions made at the frozen-conflict-level would be communicated to the state-level authority.
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