From Aid to Instability: How Foreign Arms Empower Coup d’Etats in Sub-Saharan Africa

In June 2023, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Jonathon Braga met with Niger’s Brigadier General Moussa Salaou Barmou at Air Base 101, a site bolstered by $158 million in U.S. arms sales since 2017. Just weeks later, General Barmou led a military coup that ousted Niger’s democratically elected president, reportedly using U.S.-provided weapons.

Sub-Saharan Africa is no stranger to military coups. Between 1980 and 2019, the region experienced 117 coup attempts, the most of any world region. While much has been written about the causes of coups – such as economic hardship, political instability, and weak institutions – one factor remains underexplored: the role of foreign arms transfers. My research addresses this gap, showing how the influx of heavy weaponry increases the risk of coups, especially in countries already facing political and economic vulnerabilities.

Key Findings

To explore the relationship between arms transfers and coup risk, I used data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on arms transfers and the Colpus Coup Dataset on coup events from 1980 to 2019. Instead of using a simple dollar amount, SIPRI uses the Trend Indicator Value (TIV) measurement, which quantifies arms transfer volume based on production cost. Essentially, it’s not a simple dollar measurement, but looks at the utility of weapons overall. 

Using Poisson regression, I modeled how arms imports influence coup risk, controlling for variables like GDP growth, youth unemployment, and military expenditures. I also incorporated lagged variables to assess the delayed effects of arms imports. 

I identified two key findings:

First, arms imports increase coup risk over time: For every $1 million increase in arms imports, the risk of a coup rises by about 0.3% over time (see figure 1). While this may seem small, it becomes significant when considering that many countries receive millions in arms annually. 

 

Second, arms amplify existing vulnerabilities: Arms transfers do not create the conditions for a coup but instead provide the military with the means to respond quickly to political unrest. In nations already grappling with slow economic growth, high youth unemployment, or weak institutions, arms imports give the military the ability to act decisively, turning unrest into a coup.

Case Study: Nigeria

Nigeria’s experience provides a clear example of how arms imports can contribute to instability. In 1990, Nigeria imported $18 million in heavy weaponry, including tanks, artillery, and aircraft. According to my model, this corresponds with an increased likelihood of a coup in 1993 by 6.3% compared to a world in which no arms were imported in 1990. In 1992, the country imported $58 million in arms, correlating to a 19.14% increase in coup likelihood in 1993. 

Nigeria did, in fact, experience a coup in 1993. While it’s difficult to gauge how much of a role arms transfers played in this, my analysis suggests that while political discontent and economic hardship were motivating factors, the availability of foreign arms may have allowed the military to act on these grievances. The 1993 coup disrupted Nigeria’s path toward democracy and set back its economic development – one of many examples of how crucial it is to understand the mechanisms behind coups in order to prevent them. 

Policy Implications

My research challenges the assumption that arms exports stabilize fragile nations. Instead, arms often act as a “tipping point,” enabling military takeovers in already unstable countries. Policymakers must reconsider the logic behind arms exports, especially to countries with weak institutions or struggling economies.

To mitigate the risks, policymakers could condition arms sales on governance reforms or spread out arms deliveries to avoid sudden surges in military capacity that could destabilize fragile governments. Ultimately, avoiding coups will necessitate addressing the root causes of instability, such as poverty, corruption, and institutional weaknesses, rather than relying on militarization as a solution to security challenges.

From Niger to Nigeria, the story is clear: foreign arms transfers, often viewed as tools for stability, can inadvertently destabilize fragile nations, turning political unrest into military action. By reassessing how and where weapons are exported, we can help mitigate the risks of coups and contribute to a more stable and secure Africa, where arms make countries less vulnerable, not more.

Darby Fitzsimmons is a senior at Indiana University’s O’Neill School of Public & Environmental Affairs.