



An Analysis of Community Supervision Fines and Fees in Indiana

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Abstract

Monetary sanctions refer to an assortment of fines, fees, restitution, and other financial costs or punishments levied by the criminal justice system to its clients. This report examines several types of monetary sanctions in the state of Indiana from 2016 to 2019, in three types of agencies: probation, parole, and community corrections. The report finds that fees are the most concerning, and burgeoning, aspect of monetary sanctions. Fees assessed for individuals on community supervision can be organized into four broad categories based on whether the fee was assessed by (1) county courts, (2) supervision agencies, (3) supervision-related agencies such as drug testing companies, or (4) external program providers such as mental health treatment centers. Results detail the average amounts supervision clients are charged, able to pay, and have converted into either collections agencies or civil judgment. We compare characteristics of locations (urban, rural, suburban, mixed), agencies (probation, community corrections, parole), and individuals themselves (risk, demographics, offense type). We examine predictive models to explore whether and how financial sanctions may contribute to absconding behavior, violations of supervision, extensions of supervision, and revocation of supervision (i.e., spending time in jail or prison due to violations of supervision).

Introduction

Background

Description of monetary sanctions on community supervision. In Indiana, community

Probation: In Indiana, probation is part of the judiciary branch; 107,000 adults are supervised on probation.

Parole: Parole is governed by the state/executive branch; 6,802 adults are supervised on parole.

Community Corrections: 89 of 92 counties in Indiana participate in the Community Corrections Act. Under this hybrid model, 17,541 adults are supervised at the county-level using state funds and governed by community advisory boards.

supervision includes probation, community corrections, and parole. Monetary sanctions refer to an assortment of fines, fees, restitution, and other financial costs or punishments levied by the criminal justice system to its clients. This report focuses mainly on fees which are the most concerning aspect of monetary sanctions; however, we also outline fines, restitution, and other related costs. Fees assessed for individuals on community supervision can be organized into four broad categories based on whether the fee was assessed by (1) county courts, (2)

supervision agencies, (3) supervision-related agencies such as drug testing companies, or (4) external program providers such as mental health treatment centers.

Agency Oversight. Probation is governed by the judiciary branch (i.e., judges at the county level) and includes all four types of fees. Probation fees are held in what is referred to as a local ‘supplemental adult probation services fund.’

Parole is governed by the state, or executive level. They receive funding through the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC). The IDOC does not require parole districts to administer or collect traditional user fees – or those that cover the costs of services utilized on

parole. Parole does levy charges for three of the four categories. Parole does not charge clients fees to use its supervision services (Fee Category #2). However, each parole district is permitted to collect these specific fees, when applicable: Interstate Compact requests, Home Curfew, and Urine Drug Screen fees, DOC Assist, and sex offense services.

Community corrections is governed by the state who, in turn, issues funding to local courts to supervise lower-level offenses sentenced to the Indiana Department of Correction. Community corrections supervises individuals ordered to serve community supervision with electronic monitoring, home detention, GPS monitoring, or BACtrack (a smartphone-based alcohol monitoring device). Community corrections supervision could be ordered as part of pretrial release, part of a post-conviction sentence, or as an added condition of probation. If the client is serving a probation term with an added condition of electronic monitoring, community corrections will collect fees from the individual, but the probation department maintains control of the supervision (and violation) process. Community corrections also supervises individuals who are transitioning out of the Department of Corrections (DOC) facilities and are part of the Community Transition Program (CTP), as well as individuals who are part of the DOC work release program. Like probation, they charge all four categories of fees.

Population Profile

The State of Indiana has 92 counties and an estimated population of 6,732,219 individuals (2019). Similarly sized states include Arizona, Tennessee, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Missouri. The state has five large counties that contain more than 250,000 people and 12 moderately sized ‘urban/suburban’ areas. Most of the state is rural – 75 out of the 92 counties.

At the end of 2016, Indiana probation departments were supervising 122,857 adults and juveniles. Over the past ten years, since 2009, probation has decreased 16% percent. Felony

probation has decreased only slightly by five percent, whereas misdemeanor probation has decreased 27%. Of the 34,714 people who completed probation with a felony, 9,822 were revoked (i.e., 28%). Similarly of the 47,747 people who completed probation with a misdemeanor, 7,953 (or 17%) were revoked. The most common offense categories on probation include substance use convictions, representing >40% of both felony and misdemeanor probation cases. (Statewide figures for community corrections and parole were unavailable.)

Research Questions

This study answers four central research questions, each containing several parts. First, what types of fines, fees, and restitution are individuals on supervision assessed? What are the allowable amounts for each? Further, how many individuals have their fines and fees waived or adjusted? What are the reasons for these waivers and adjustments? What is the process to obtain a waiver or adjustment? Second, what is the total state, county, and agency revenue collected from monetary sanctions annually? What proportion of these budgets are funded by clients' monetary sanctions? Third, are clients of community supervision receiving civil judgments for nonpayment of monetary sanctions? If so, what types of civil judgments do they receive? Finally, fourth, how do fines, fees, and restitution impact various supervision outcomes? Specifically, are clients who are assessed more in fees and fines and/or have greater nonpayment of fees and fines more likely to: (1) receive sanctions, (2) abscond, (3) have their sentences extended, (4) or have their supervision revoked?

Methods

Sampling Procedures

Recruitment. We recruited supervision agencies from urban, suburban, and rural supervision agencies in Indiana. To identify potential agencies, we first consulted with an executive board member of the Probation Officers Professional Association of Indiana (POPAI) to learn which counties may be interested in participating in a study on fines and fees, kept reliable records (not necessarily digital), and had enough staff to help with our requests (e.g., respond to email, provide office space to review paper records). We made a list of possible counties and then reached out by calling and/or emailing heads of offices (e.g., Chief Probation Officer, Parole District Supervisor). In the end, we selected three county probation agencies (one urban, one suburban, and one rural), three parole regions, and three community corrections agencies (one urban, one suburban, and one rural) for a total of nine agencies.

Random sampling. Within these agencies, our goal was to select a random sample of supervision clients who began their periods of supervision between January 1st, 2012 and December 31st, 2012. However, our goal of random selection was quickly complicated by Indiana's data practice of destroying paper files after seven years. This meant that when we arrived at offices in fall of 2018, many files from individuals eligible for our sampling range had already been shredded. In response, we expanded our sampling range to include more recent years, for which files were not on the shredding block. We obtained a random sample of at least 100 people (in smaller counties) or five percent of clients from each agency (in larger counties).

Table 1.
Population Comparisons: County, Supervision Agency, and Sample

County Type	Agency Type	County Size	Agency Size	Sample (% of Agency Size)	Sample Size	Sample Year
Urban	Probation	500,000 to 1 million	<10,000	6.1%	500	2017
	Community Corrections		<25,000	7.9%	500	2017
Suburban	Probation	100,000 to 200,000	<2,000	9.5%	139	2016
Rural	Probation	<50,000	<200	25%	50	2016
	Community Corrections		<100	50%	50	2016
Mixed Suburban/Rural	Parole (Region C)	400,000 to 600,000	<500	21.2%	100	2016
	Parole (Region A)	400,000 to 600,000	<500	23.2%	100	2016
Mixed Urban/Suburban/Rural	Parole (Region B)	400,000 to 600,000	<500	20%	100	2016
Total – 2012					200	
Total – 2016/2017					1539	

Note: Each parole district contains approximately 10 counties.

Sample Size

Data range of sample.¹ We collected the first case of supervision for supervision clients who began their periods of supervision between January 1st, 2016 and December 31st, 2016.

Inclusion criteria. We selected only the first case of supervision a client had with the agency in our study, in 2016. Because most agencies do not share files across counties or across

¹ Our original goal was to collect the first case of supervision for supervision clients who began their periods of supervision between January 1st, 2012 and December 31st, 2012. As a result of research sites in the study (five other states) being unable to access files as old as 2012, we also began collecting more recent data – usually 2016 or 2017 – based on agency availability. For example, many agencies switched computer systems during this time frame. When possible, we selected the database which had the more complete and more reliable data (e.g., agents were entering data consistently, in similar manners). Thus, in short, for many sites we have two data ranges (2012 as well as 2016/2017).

agencies (e.g., probation and community corrections in the same county) it remains possible that one individual could be in our sample for one case in probation and another case in community corrections. However, we are not able to identify these individuals.²

Exclusion criteria. Individuals were excluded from the sample if they were not supervised in the focus county, were a juvenile, had a supervision time of less than seven days, or were only on pre-trial supervision. We also excluded cases for which the individual's records could not be located. This yielded a total sample of 1,539 supervision clients across probation, community corrections, and parole.

Data collection. We began collecting data at each site during fall 2018 for each agency's administrative records. Administrative data encompasses all data pulled from computer systems or pulled from paper file folders regarding clients and their supervision within that agency. We had all such data in hand by fall 2019.

To provide some level of confidentiality to our participating supervision agencies, Table 1 shows the approximate census populations of the counties participating in our study. To demonstrate how closely our final sample sizes align with county populations as well as supervision agency populations, we present those sample sizes as well.

² It is possible, and not uncommon, that an individual may serve multiple terms of community supervision as part of the same court case, for example, serving first a term of probation, followed by a revocation resulting in prison time, followed by a term of parole. However, identifying these cases was not possible for this study – due to the inability to link individual cases of supervision from probation to parole. Therefore, we focus on just the supervision case that made the person eligible for our study, and not the court case. Thus, we exclude fees for any *prior* community supervision fees due to incomplete/revoked probation or community corrections supervision terms that occurred prior to their eligibility for our study. It remains possible for an individual to be included twice in our sample, if they were supervised on both probation and community corrections in the sample time frame.

In all agencies, we obtained a sample size of at least 50 individuals. In the smaller agencies, even this group of 50 clients represented 25 to 50% of the agency's caseload. In larger counties, we sampled 500 clients, which equated to 6 to 10% of that agency's client population.³

Measures

Dependent variables. The key dependent variables for this study include (1) fines, (2) fees including county court fees, supervision fees, supervision-related fees, and programming fees, (3) restitution, as well as (4) outcomes related to both fines and fees and supervision.

Control variables. We examined key demographic characteristics that may have a relationship to fines and fees, according to previous literature. They include race, sex, age, felony, risk level, and offense type. All demographics were captured at the beginning of the first active probation placement in the dataset.

Payment and balances. For each category of fees as well as for fines and restitution, we examined (1) the proportion of fines and fees that a client paid,⁴ as well as (2) the proportion of balance clients had remaining.⁵ At the end of a supervision term, in many locations in our study, if individuals had unpaid fines and fees, the amount was transferred to a civil docket (i.e., civil judgment) where the client could continue to pay.

Sentence types include suspended, split, or executed. Suspended Sentence is defined as no executed time ordered to be served (i.e., jail, prison, home detention). Other types of

³ We also examined how closely the demographics of our final sample corresponded to the demographics of both the agency and the county. Although we would not expect our sample to match the demographics of the county, we do expect the clients in our sample to be similar to the clients in the agency from which it was drawn. There were no significant differences between our sample and the agency/site in terms of race, age, or percent male³ (see Table 2).

⁴ The variable captures the amount of money a person paid on each type divided by what they were assessed to create a proportion with a theoretical range of 0 to 1.

⁵ Because some individuals received waivers, they did not need to pay for some categories of monetary sanctions, even though their accounts showed a charge. Thus, we created a proportion variable that measured the balance individuals owed for each type of monetary sanction divided by what they were assessed; the theoretical range is 0 to 1.

sentences include split sentences; for example, sentenced to both probation and community corrections. These are original sentences from the court for the case; not amended sentences. We defined executed sentence as a sentence for which any time was ordered to be served in home detention, jail, or prison.

Risk level is measured using the Indiana Risk Assessment Scoring tool (IRAS) which is derived from the Ohio Risk Assessment Scoring tool (ORAS). Scores on these subdimensions are used to classify clients into very high risk, high risk, moderate risk, and low risk.

Supervision outcome is coded as what state a person was in at the end of their period of supervision: successful, unsuccessful, revoked, active, absconded, or deceased. We relied on the category case managers selected to close out a case; there seems to be inconsistent coding on this variable between case managers and agencies. Overall, 58% of the dataset ended supervision successfully. If the term of supervision ended early or was extended beyond the original sentence, we captured those outcomes as well.

Violation is defined as a petition being filed with the courts for probation and community corrections clients, or with the parole board for parole clients. Violation is coded as a dichotomous variable (1 = yes, 0 = no) with the date the event occurred. We know type of violation (e.g., technical or new offense) for most of the sample (i.e., we do not have it for the urban or rural probation agencies or urban privatized community corrections). For agencies that provided information violation type (i.e., technical or new offense), we also have coded yes/no if violation was for substance use, failure to appear, nonpayment of fees, or other.

Revocation of probation or community corrections supervision means that a previously suspended sentence is ordered to be executed (either in part or in whole). Revocation of parole indicates the client was returned to prison for some amount of time. Revocation was coded based

on a client's discharge type in the supervision management system or the presence of a revocation based on file reviews. It is coded as a dichotomous variable (1 = yes, 0 = no) with the date the event occurred. We captured whether revocation ended the supervision period (yes, no) or whether they experienced a revocation and were reinstated onto supervision (yes, no). We have date variables for both types of revocation variables.

Absconding was coded as a dichotomous variable (1=yes, 0=no) when a client recorded as “absconding” from supervision in the supervision agency data. This generally indicates the supervision agent is unable to make contact with the clients, sometimes after several attempts.

Extension of Supervision is coded as dichotomous variables (1=yes, 0=no). Extension was captured in two ways: (1) extension of supervision was recorded result of a violation of supervision, or (2) the difference between the length of the supervision sentence and the actual length of supervision is greater than 9 days (to allow for day entry errors).

Missingness. In our sample, the amount of missingness varies tremendously, with urban agencies having the highest rates followed by rural, then by the suburban and mixed-type agencies. The latter agencies have low and acceptable rates of missingness. For more information on missingness in our sample, see Table A1 in the Appendices.

Findings

Descriptive Statistics

We examined how well our sample of individuals matched the demographic profile of individuals in the agency from which we selected our sample. We found that for all our agencies including probation, community corrections, and parole, the demographics of our selected sample aligned closely with the demographics of the agency in terms of race (see Table 2). As expected, percent white is lower in urban areas and higher in rural areas, for both agencies and

our selected sample. In urban areas, percent white is around 50% and is higher in suburban areas (~82%) as well as rural (>90%). Each parole agency is comprised of about ten counties and a variety of urban, rural, and suburban counties. Nevertheless, the percent white varies by less than +/- five percent between each agency and selected sample.

Similarly, percent male in our selected sample aligns closely with percent male in the agency populations. Agencies in rural areas have higher proportions of male clients (85-98%) than agencies in urban areas (73-78%). Community corrections and parole agencies have more males than probation agencies, overall. The average age of the sample ranges from 33 to 38, with clients on parole being slightly older than probation and community corrections clients.

Across our three agency types, we examined sentence types, risk levels, violent offenses, and felonies. In Table 3, as expected, most clients on probation originally received suspended sentences for their case (80-92%). Whereas for clients on community corrections and parole, the most common types of sentences were executed sentences or split sentences (i.e., a sentence for which any time was ordered to be served in home detention, jail, or prison).

What is interesting here is the number of people on parole who originally had suspended sentences – between 9 and 16% of people on parole originally started off with a sentence to probation. These clients later ended up in prison and then on parole – for that same criminal case. This highlights a failure on probation. However, in our sample, the information regarding the probation case is not available to us. For example, the fines and fees load from probation likely impacts the time on parole, but we do not have reliable data to investigate this claim.

Table 2.*Demographics: Agency and Sample*

County Type	Agency Type	Percent White		Percent Male		Average Age (Mean)	
		Agency	Sample	Agency	Sample	Agency	Sample
Urban	Probation	48%	49%	73%	73%	34	36
	Comm Corrections - County	47%	47%	81%	78%	34	34
	Comm Corrections - Privatized	52%	49%	77%	75%	37	35
Suburban	Probation	82%	81%	73%	78%	36	33
Rural	Probation	-	90%	-	70%	-	37
	Comm Corrections	96%	96%	98%	98%	32	32
Mixed Suburban/ Rural	Parole A	75%	74.5%	89%	90%	37	38
	Parole C	92%	87%	84%	82%	37	36
Mixed Urban/ Rural/Suburban	Parole B	88%	85%	84%	85%	35	34

Table 3.*Other Variables: Sample*

County Type	Agency Type	Sentence Type			Risk Level			Violent Offense	Felony
		Suspended	Split	Executed	High	Mod	Low		
Full Sample	Probation	84.5%	14.8%	-	26.0%	25.2%	48.8%	15.8%	38.1%
	Comm Corr	9.3%	33.2%	57.2%	49.7%	29.6%	20.7%	15.6%	76.7%
	Parole	13.6%	17.7%	68.7%	36.9%	41.0%	22.1%	14.6%	99.7%
Urban	Probation	84.5%	18.6%	-	24.4%	32.6%	43.0%	18.2%	44.2%
	Comm Corr – County	9.3%	30.7%	61.6%	57.7%	28.0%	14.3%	18.1%	79.4%
	Comm Corr – Privatized	20.5%	38.6%	41.0%	9.2%	30.8%	60.0%	2.4%	60.2%
Suburban	Probation	80.4%	3.2%	-	35.8%	1.7%	62.5%	9.6%	22.4%
Rural	Probation	91.5%	8.5%	-	3.4%	20.7%	72.4%	9.9%	22.5%
	Comm Corr	0%	66.7%	33.3%	13.0%	56.2%	30.4%	12.5%	83.3%
Mixed Suburban /Rural	Parole A	9.1%	15.2%	75.8%	37.4%	40.4%	22.2%	23.2%	100%
	Parole C	15.5%	21.6%	62.9%	33.0%	39.4%	27.7%	14.4%	99%
Mixed Urban/Rural /Suburban	Parole B	16.3%	16.3%	67.3%	40.2%	43.3%	16.5%	6.1%	100%

Regarding risk levels, probation agencies have the lowest-risk clients independent of location in rural, suburban, urban, or mixed-type counties. Both community corrections and parole agencies have primarily moderate- to high-risk clients. These are aligned with the purposes of each agency – that is, probation agencies are meant to supervise clients with less serious offense types.

However, at odds with this finding is that violent offenses are equally common across the three agency types – about 15% of cases, regardless of agency type, are for violent offenses. Our best explanation is that a violent offense case on probation might be a first-time offense, and thus a lower-risk client, than a violent offense case on parole which may have been a higher-risk and repeat offender.

As expected, probation supervises the lowest percentage of felony cases (38% of their caseload) followed by community corrections (76.7% of their clients have felony offenses). Almost 100% of parole clients have a felony conviction.

RQ1a. Types of Fines and Fees Assessed & Allowable Amounts

To understand the overall landscape of fines and fees in community corrections, in this section, we describe the types of fines, fees, and restitution clients of supervision are assessed. We also explain the parameters for the allowable amounts for these monetary sanctions, set by state laws and agency policies.

Recall, in Indiana, community supervision includes three distinct types of agencies including probation, community corrections, and parole who each can collect fines, fees, and restitution. This report focuses mainly on fees which are the most concerning aspect of monetary sanctions; however, we also outline fines, restitution, and other related costs, when data is available.

Fees assessed for individuals on community supervision can be organized into four broad categories based on whether the fee was assessed by (1) county courts, (2) supervision agencies, (3) supervision-related agencies such as drug testing companies, or (4) external program providers such as mental health treatment centers.

Table 4. <i>County Court Fees, Permitted by State Statute</i>	
Name of Fee	Amount
Standard Court Costs^{ab}	\$183
Public Defender Fees^c	Determined by court
Marijuana Eradication Program Fee^d	Max: \$300
Drug Abuse Interdiction Fee^d	Min: \$200; Max \$1,000
Alcohol and Drug Countermeasures Fee^d	\$200
Alcohol Abuse Deterrent Program Fee^d	Max: \$400
Child Abuse Prevention Fee^d	\$100
Domestic Violence Prevention Fee^d	\$50
Safe Schools Fee^d	Min: \$200; Max \$1,000
Sexual Assault Victims Assistance Fee^d	Min: \$500; Max: \$5,000
<i>Notes:</i>	
<i>^a For example, court administration fee, document storage fee, automated record keeping fee, jury fees, judicial salaries fee, etc.</i>	
<i>^b Indiana State Statute IC 33-37-4-1</i>	
<i>^c Indiana State Statute IC 33-37-2-3</i>	
<i>^d Indiana State Statute IC 33-37-4</i>	

Fees to County Courts. The first category of county court fees includes standard court costs and public defender fees (see Table 4). Depending on the client’s offense, in addition to the standard costs, they may also be charged other fees such as alcohol and drug countermeasure fees or child abuse prevention fees. Fees paid to courts vary from \$50 to \$5,000 (see Table 4).⁶

⁶ To track the assessment and payment of fees to the courts, most court systems in Indiana adopted the same case management system (i.e., Odyssey) around 2010.

Fees to Supervision Agencies.⁷ The second category of fees includes community supervision fees, also called standard fees (see Table 5). In Indiana, these are fees individuals pay simply for being on probation or community corrections supervision, but not parole supervision, which does not charge these fees.

Probation supervision fees are permitted by state statute; they encompass administrative fees, initial user fees, and monthly user fees. Although these fees go to the supervision agencies' revenue, county courts set the allowable ranges for these fees. Courts are also able to adjust and/or waive the standard supervision fee due to client inability to pay (i.e., indigency).⁸

Table 5.		
<i>Supervision and Supervision-Related Fees, Permitted by State Statute</i>		
Name of Fee	Amount	
	Misdemeanor	Felony
Probation		
<i>Supervision Fees</i>		
Administrative Fee	\$50	\$100
Initial User Fee	<\$50	\$25 - \$100
Monthly User Fee	\$10 - \$20	\$15 - \$30
<i>Supervision-Related Fees</i>		
Transfer Fee	In-State: \$75; Out of State: \$125	
Home Detention & Electronic Monitoring Fees	Not regulated by state statute	
Drug Screening, Community Service, etc.	Not regulated by state statute	
Community Corrections		
<i>Supervision Fees</i>		
Administrative, Set up, Monthly Fees (Including home detention and electronic monitoring)	Not regulated by state statute	
<i>Supervision-Related Fees</i>		
Drug Screening, Community Service, etc.	Not regulated by state statute	
Parole		
<i>Supervision Fees</i>		
Does not collect standard fees		
<i>Supervision-Related Fees</i>		
Transfer Fee	\$125	
Drug Screening	Not regulated by state statute	

⁷ Unlike court costs which are recorded in one statewide database, supervision fees are tracked in a large variety of case management systems depending on county preferences.

⁸ Indigency hearings should occur prior to sentencing to determine an individual's ability to pay fines and/or costs (fees) according to IC 35-38-1-18 and 33-37-2-3.

Community Corrections supervision fees are set by their local advisory boards. Thus, these fees are not set by state statute. Information on fee limits must be obtained from each community corrections agency; we were unable to access this information for each county in the state. We do have information for counties included in our study.

Supervision-Related Fees. Also shown in Table 5, the third category of monetary sanctions is supervision-related fees. These are fees that fall outside of the standard supervision user fees; they are required under all three types of supervision agencies (i.e., probation, community corrections, and parole), given that individuals utilize the extra services. These fees include charges for additional services or requirements such as drug screening, community service, electronic monitoring, or transfer fees. Some counties provide these services internally and are able to keep records of payments. Some contract with third-party vendors to supply these services and therefore are unable to track charges or payments.⁹

Programming Fees. The fourth category of monetary sanctions includes charges for programming that is required by all three types of supervision agencies (i.e., probation, community corrections, and parole), given that individuals need programming services. These program fees are always external to the supervision agencies. For example, in cases where a substance use is a contributing factor to the offense, it is common for alcohol or drug abuse evaluation to be required. That fee is paid to an external substance treatment provider. Other costs in this category include, for example, mental health treatment and sex offender treatment.

⁹ In our study, about half of agencies provided services internally and have records on what was charged and what was paid. This type of fee is sometimes tracked in a database but also sometimes tracked on paper receipts or in case notes. Data for these types of fees is not easily queried and paper records are less than reliable. We therefore only have this data for our suburban county and our parole regions.

Programming fees are paid directly to the vendor and are not recorded by, or accessible to, the community supervision departments.¹⁰

Fines and Restitution. Fines and restitution are each imposed by courts at sentencing. Fines are best thought of as monetary punishment levied by the courts that goes toward court revenue. Restitution, on the other hand, is court-ordered compensation that goes to victims. Whereas fines are limited by state statutes (\$10,000 for felonies and \$500 to \$5,000 for misdemeanors) and can be waived for indigent clients, restitution is not limited and is not waived for indigency. Fines and restitution are tracked by all counties using the Odyssey case management system.

Percent of Clients Assessed Monetary Sanctions. Figure 1 shows the percentage of clients who are charged court fees, supervision fees, fines, and restitution. Across all three agency types (probation, parole, and community corrections), court fees and supervision fees are far more common than restitution or fines. Recall that clients on parole do not receive supervision fees in Indiana. Probation and parole clients were more likely to receive court fees (81%, 90%, respectively) than community corrections clients (65%).

Average Assessment for Clients. Across all types of supervision agencies, restitution amounts were the most similar (approximately \$900; see Figure 2). Fines were also similar in size across agencies at approximately \$50 per client. Greater variation was seen in court fees and supervision fees.

¹⁰ Thus, we do not have this data for most of our dataset.

Figure 1.
Percentage of Clients Charged Fees, Fines and Restitution





Figure 2.
Average Amount of Fees, Among Those Assessed



Regarding court fees, community corrections clients were least often assessed court fees (see Figure 1), and their court fees were the lowest, on average, at \$229 (see Figure 2).

Compared to community corrections, both probation and parole clients had higher average court costs at \$407 for their period of supervision.

Looking at supervision fees, similar percentages of clients on probation and community corrections (80-90%) were charged supervision fees. The amounts varied widely – with probation supervision fees around \$404 and community corrections at \$1,763. Community corrections supervision fees are likely high due to the use of electronic monitoring and home detention.

Whereas Figure 2 shows averages across individuals in each type of supervision, Table 6 helps us look at how those averages vary by individuals’ characteristics. In general, monetary sanctions are higher for more serious offenses (i.e., felony as compared to misdemeanor), regardless of what type of the four monetary sanctions being examined. Further, monetary sanctions are higher for certain types of offenses, as expected, people convicted of something that requires treatment, such as a drug or sex-related offense have higher supervision fees. Similarly, individuals convicted of property offenses have higher restitution than those convicted of other types of criminal behavior.

Table 6.				
<i>Average Assessments by Offense Level, Offense Type, and Indigency</i>				
	Avg. Court Fees	Avg. Supv. Fees	Avg. Fines	Avg. Restitution
Offense Level				
<i>Misdemeanor</i>	\$363	\$423	\$3	\$197
<i>Felony</i>	\$375	\$1323	\$5	\$769
Offense Type				
<i>Property</i>	\$206	\$839	\$4	\$1982
<i>Violent</i>	\$175	\$957	\$2	\$625
<i>Sex Offense</i>	\$325	\$1122	\$1	\$0
<i>Alcohol & Drug</i>	\$425	\$896	\$5	\$80
<i>Other</i>	\$226	\$916	\$7	\$139

Predictive Analysis of the Assessment of Monetary Sanctions

In this section, we discuss the factors that may be related to whether a person is assessed fines and fees and the total amounts of those fines and fees.

Assessment of Monetary Sanctions (Y/N). Logistic regression was completed for each type of monetary sanction assessment: supervision fees, court fees, fines, and restitution. Keep in mind that this analysis is only looking at whether each of these types of monetary sanctions were assessed, not the amounts. The complete results of those analysis can be found in the Appendices, Tables A2 through A5.

No significant factors were found when prediction assessment of **supervision fees**. The significant factors in assessment of **court fees** include alcohol and drug related and violent offenses having higher odds of assessment which is expected due to the automatic application of some court-assessed fees for those of offenses. As expected, most types of offenses had lower odds of being assessed **restitution** as compared to property offenses. No other significance was found in the assessment of restitution. There were some other significant factors in the assessment of **court fees** and **fines** but no clear patterns emerged. Additionally, the constants were significant across the board for both court fees and fines indicating there may be other factors affecting these outcomes.

Amount of the Assessments of Monetary Sanctions. Linear regression analysis was completed to determine what factors may be associated with higher total loads being assessed. Restitution was not included in this analysis because of the unusually high sums and relatively infrequent assessment. Unsurprisingly, we found that the factors associated with higher total amounts being assessed were felony offenses and drug-related offense. Felony offenses are often associated with longer supervision sentences and drug-related offense are often associated with

automatically applied additional fees. Both resulting in a higher total load. A few other factors that were associated with lower amounts assessed in probation only; black, female, and moderate risk.

Table 7.
Regression Predicting Total Amount of Supervision Fees, Court Fees, and Fines Assessed

Measure	Probation	Community Corrections	Parole
	Odds ratio (Exp[β])	Odds Ratio (Exp[β])	Odds Ratio (Exp[β])
Race (Ref: White)			
Black	-0.139***	0.095*	-0.078
Other	-0.027	-0.006	0.044
Female (Ref: Male)	-0.111**	0.006	0.035
Age (in years)	-0.019	0.018	-0.833
Risk (Ref: Low Risk)			
Moderate Risk	-0.179***	-0.020	-2.594*
High Risk	-0.073	-0.104	-2.021*
Offense Type (Ref: Property)			
Violent	0.077	0.094	-0.122
Alcohol and Drug	0.309***	0.226***	0.053
Sex Offense	0.083*	0.000	-0.041
Other	0.022	0.175**	-0.121
Felony Offense (Ref: Misd)	0.193***	0.218***	-. ^b
Constant	***	-	***
R ²	0.157	0.080	0.076
F	(11, 532)	(11, 484)	(10, 259)
	9.007	3.812	2.121
P	<0.001	<0.001	0.023
N	544	496	270

Notes:
^a Variables excluded: employment, education, income, supervision level, special caseload/caseload type, substance abuse and mental health diagnosis, dependent children, housing
^b Felony offense not included for parole as nearly all offenses are felonies
*. p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001

RQ1b. Waivers and Adjustments to Fines and Fees

In this section, we answer the second part of the first research question: What are the reasons for waivers and adjustments? How many individuals have their fines and fees waived or adjusted? What is the process to obtain a waiver or adjustment?

Obtaining Waivers and Adjustments. Waivers refer to when a client has their debt completely, or partially, reduced by their courts; it can occur in two ways. First, some clients may have their monetary sanctions waived prior to the assessment stage; in other words, they are never assessed certain types of monetary sanctions in the first place. Those individuals were categorized as “not assessed” in Figure 1. Second, other clients may initially be assessed monetary sanctions and then, later, receive waivers to those monetary sanctions. Waivers are generally given due to indigency as determined by the courts.

Adjustments, on the other hand, may be given by either the courts or the supervision agency, and can be given for reasons other than indigency. Common reasons for adjustments include reducing supervision fees when a client’s supervision is shortened (i.e., due to revocation, or release for good time). Rarely, there may also be adjustments for clerical errors. Clients can receive waivers for some or all of their monetary sanctions (i.e., fees, fines or restitution). A waiver does not apply to all categories automatically.

Waivers by Courts. To obtain a waiver from the court, a hearing is first held to determine the individual’s ability to pay monetary sanctions. The court will determine indigency *specifically for each*: court costs, supervision costs, fines and the cost of a lawyer. Costs may be waived in full or reduced. Ideally, and most commonly, this hearing is conducted by the court before imposing monetary sanctions. This could result in monetary sanctions not even be assessed (i.e., the data would show that \$0 were assessed).

What can also happen is that a client receives a waiver, after this hearing, and after some monetary sanctions have been levied, because their circumstances have changed. For example, they lost their job and are no longer able to pay the same amount of monetary sanctions.

In some courts, waivers are rarely utilized. In fact, even if these courts determine a client is indigent, they may still assess (and not waive) monetary sanctions. In these cases, however, courts are not allowed to enforce payment of the monetary sanctions on indigent clients. Although the courts cannot make indigent clients pay, they have found a way to let the debt sit on the clients' record (by moving unpaid debt to a special caseload called a civil judgment docket)- which is a part of public record.

Adjustments. Adjustments can be granted by either courts or supervision agencies. Courts can typically adjust any type of monetary sanction whereas supervision agencies can only adjust their own fees – supervision fees. For all the supervision agencies in our study, adjustments can be made by the supervision agency for incomplete requirements or shortened supervision length (e.g., due to early release or revocation).

For all the supervision agencies in our study,¹¹ if a client indicates concern regarding their ability to pay fees, the supervision officer completes a financial assessment worksheet to reassess the client's expected monthly payment. Assuming the client has greater financial need, the client will receive an adjustment to their supervision fees. Typically, this means they will pay fewer dollars per month (toward their total supervision bill) but they will not necessarily have their total supervision bill reduced, effectively giving them more time to pay (but not more months on supervision). The worksheet may also be completed any time during supervision that a client's financial situation changes, for example, with changes in employment, marriage status, or living arrangements. Therefore, the policy does not forgive or reduce debt, it just delays the person's requirement to pay off the same amount of debt.¹²

¹¹ The rural probation agency did not have written policies, and was unable to share informal practice, related to waivers and adjustments.

¹² The urban community corrections agency stands in contrast to this policy. They do reduce the overall amount owed, not just the monthly amount.


Frequency of Waivers and Adjustments. Figure 3 shows the four different types of monetary sanctions that can be assessed, and then waived or adjusted, for supervision clients. The table is broken down by supervision agency type: probation, community corrections, and parole. The bars indicate the total percentage of people assessed a particular type of monetary sanction. For example, the first bar in Figure 3 shows that a little more than 80% of people on probation were assessed court fees. Of those 80%, about 15% received waivers or adjustments (the orange-shaded part of the top line) to their court fees. However, about 65% did not receive waivers or adjustments (the blue-shaded part of the line).

Recall from Figure 1, when looking at the overall picture, court fees and supervision fees are more commonly utilized than fines or restitution. Approximately 65-90% of clients are assessed court and supervision fees. Whereas, fewer than 20% of clients receive fines or restitution.

Most important to the topic at hand, waivers and adjustments are most commonly granted for user fees (i.e., court or supervision fees) and are rarely granted for fines and restitution (i.e., things usually paid to victim organizations, for example). Not shown in Figure 3, across agency types, when a waiver or adjustment to fees was provided to clients, those amounts were relatively consistent. On average, clients received approximately \$250 to \$300 for waivers/adjustments made to court fees and slightly more for waivers/adjustments made to supervision fees (\$375). Although these amounts sound small or inconsequential, nearly 30% of clients who receive a waiver/adjustment have their whole balance zeroed out. Thus, they are generally being used to provide clients a proportionally large amount of financial relief. However, important differences emerge when you look at the agencies individually.

Looking specifically at patterns in waivers and adjustments in probation, they seem to be waived, in similar proportion, across all four types of monetary sanctions. What is interesting is looking at community corrections, that waivers and adjustments are granted only for certain types of monetary sanctions: court fees and fines, and rarely for supervision fees. This could be because supervision fees are largely due to electronic monitoring and those are necessary components of community corrections and harder to waive, but our next set of tables provides a different explanation.

Figure 3.
Monetary Sanctions Assessed: Percent of Waivers or Adjustments Granted



RQ2. Departmental Revenue from Fines and Fees

In this section, we present the total state, county, and agency revenue collected from monetary sanctions annually. We also present what proportion of those budgets are funded by clients’ monetary sanctions. In 2016, Indiana collected revenue and expenditure data including

probation supervision fees, pretrial fees, civil case fees, and criminal case fees. They did not include restitution, which is paid directly to victim funds. In Table 7, the information is broken down into (1) state expenditures versus (2) county, city, town, or township spending. Note, data from the largest city – Indianapolis – is separate from other counties (i.e., Marion City).

Table 8. <i>Statewide Expenditures and Revenue – Court System including Probation</i>			
Item	County, City, Town, and Township	State	TOTAL
Expenditures			
<i>Personnel</i>			
Salaries	\$193,219,684	\$92,161,515	
Benefits and Other Costs	\$41,220,044		
Service by Contract		\$11,859,231	
<i>Material, Parts, and Supplies</i>	\$4,105,881	\$1,563,733	
<i>Professional Services</i>	\$54,090,042		
<i>Capital Costs</i>	\$3,326,503	\$293,549	
<i>Utilities</i>		\$379,439	
<i>Grants/Other Local Gov./Social Service Payments</i>		\$33,757,215	
<i>Admin. and Operating Expenses</i>		\$3,989,806	
Total Expenditures by Courts	\$295,962,153	\$143,984,488	\$439,946,641
<i>State Level Revenue</i>		\$87,991,944	
<i>County Level Revenue</i>	\$68,947,240		
<i>Local Level Revenue</i>	\$11,979,291		
<i>Marion City Revenue</i>	\$2,075,584		
Total Revenue from Users	\$83,002,116	\$87,991,944	\$170,994,060
% of Expenditures from Users	28.04%	61.11%	38.87%
<i>Note: All 92 counties provided expenditure data; 91 of 92 provided revenue data.</i>			

In 2016, state and smaller court systems spent \$439,946,641 on personnel, materials, professional services, capital costs, utilities, social service payments, and administrative and operating expenses. In the same year, Indiana collected \$170,994,060 from users of those court systems. Therefore, collectively, clients in the Indiana court system paid for 39% of court expenditures in the forms of user fees and fines. That is a significant amount of a budget to be

‘covered by’ user fees; it raises concerns about an agency’s ability to be solvent without client revenue.

Proportion of County Court Spending Funded by Users. Exploring whether some types of locations, for example rural versus urban, rely more heavily on user fees than others, we compared mean expenditures and revenues from various types of counties (see Table 9). Urban counties seem to rely the least on fees, at 25% of expenditures funded by user fees. The “Rural Counties with Larger Towns” seem to be the most reliant on fees, at almost 40%.

Table 9. <i>Average Revenue and Expenditures, by County Type</i>			
	Mean Expenditures	Mean Fee Revenue	Mean Percentage of Expenditures Funded by Fee Revenue
Urban Counties	\$24,430,26	\$5,645,625	25%
Suburban Counties	\$6,262,327	\$1,834,319	32%
Rural Counties with Larger Towns	\$2,023,113	\$699,506	39%
Rural Counties with Smaller Towns	\$759,525	\$242,787	34%

Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 show the percentage of county court system expenditures that are ‘covered by’ user fees for each of the 92 counties in Indiana separated by the types of counties mentioned above.

Figure 4.
Percentage of Expenditures Funded by Fee Revenue, Urban Counties




Figure 5.
Percentage of Expenditures Funded by Fee Revenue, Suburban Counties




Figure 6.

Percentage of Expenditures Funded by Fee Revenue, Rural Counties with Larger Towns





Figure 7.

Percentage of Expenditures Funded by Fee Revenue, Rural Counties with Smaller Towns



Departmental Revenue from Fees. We replicated the statewide reporting numbers just for the agencies in our study. Table 10 shows that, compared to statewide levels (see Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7), the agencies in our samples generated less of their revenue from user fees. That is, the urban county agencies in our study funded 14% to 19% of their budget through fees as compared to the overall state average of 25%. The suburban agencies in our study funded 19% of their budget through fees as compared to 32% statewide. And, the rural agencies in our study funded 12% to 25% of their budget through fees as compared to 34% to 39% statewide.

Table 10.			
<i>Agencies in Our Sample: Percent of Budget Funded by Fee Revenue</i>			
	Total Agency Budget	Total Revenues from Fees	% of Budget Funded by Fee Revenue
Urban Probation	\$15,528,983	\$3,024,769	19%
Urban Community Corrections	\$13,315,131	\$1,812,488	14%
Suburban Probation and Community Corrections	\$5,527,428	\$1,023,000	19%
Rural Probation	\$159,892	\$40,141	25%
Rural Community Corrections	\$199,473	\$24,915	12%

RQ3. Civil Judgments

In this section, we explain what happens when clients cannot pay their monetary sanctions, including civil judgments.

Civil Judgments often result in cases where an individual has an outstanding balance at the end of supervision for their fines, court costs/fees, supervision fees, and/or restitution. Those financial obligations may be ‘reduced to judgment’ or ‘placed on the civil judgment docket’ by the courts. The Civil Judgment Docket is the clerk’s financial record keeping system where interest is calculated, payments are recorded, and the docket can be inspected by the public. In

this way, financial records could hurt an individual's financial standing even if not legally required to pay them.

In **Urban Community Corrections**, if clients are unable to pay their monetary sanctions, Collection Assistants will follow up with a client if a payment is missed. If the client fails to honor the payment agreement, the fees will be sent to City Collections. Any fees that are not paid by the completion of a resident's stay with Community Corrections will result in a Civil Judgment request being filed with the Court.

In **Urban Probation**, if the client continues to not comply with the monthly payment plan, the probation officer will proceed with appropriate sanctions, interventions, or violation processes (if appropriate). In practice, although non-payment of fees may be added to an existing Petition to Revoke (when other violations are present), they will not receive a Petition to Revoke probation solely based on non-payment of fees. However, probation can be revoked based on failure to make restitution payments. Beginning in 2016, any probation fees remaining at the end of supervision are automatically reduced to a judgment upon probation discharge and the courts may "seek appropriate steps to collect the judgment owed." (Fees, LR49-CR00-115)

In **Suburban Probation**, if an individual has fees remaining at the end of their probation supervision, the SPO should file a Petition with the Court recommending the fees be entered as a judgment, be reduced, or be waived by the Court. The Probation Department is responsible for tracking all fees owed to the Probation Department which are entered as a judgment. According to the Indiana Courts, all final judgments for the recovery of money or costs constitute a lien upon real estate and chattel real liable to execution in the county where the judgment has been entered and indexed in the Judgment Docket. If they were to so choose, the County Attorney is

responsible for enforcing the collection of fees reduced to judgment. They do not (and have not in the past) enforced those collections and have not used collection agencies.

In **Rural Community Corrections**, the office indicated that Community Corrections does not file violations with the court for non-payment of fees. However, for **Rural Probation**, either an extension of the probation term will be filed, or a violation of probation will be filed with the court for unpaid fees. A warrant will not be issued for the violation and the court does not send people to jail based upon that violation alone. When an individual is discharged unsuccessfully from probation with a remaining fee balance, the fees are reduced to a civil judgment.

Individuals on **Parole** in these districts do not receive sanctions for failure to pay fees (i.e., they do not receive violations, revocations, or civil judgments).

Table 11.			
<i>Balance at End of Supervision & Percent Receiving Civil Judgment</i>			
	Paid Off Balance	Owed Balance ¹³	
		No Civil Judgment	Civil Judgment
Offense Level			
Misdemeanor	60%	71%	29%
Felony	31%	77%	23%
Offense Type			
Property	26%	70%	30%
Violent	42%	74%	26%
Sex Offense	40%	84%	16%
Alcohol & Drug	48%	77%	23%
Other	42%	77%	23%
Assigned Public Defender			
Yes	35%	76%	24%
No	57%	73%	27%
Indigent to Fees			
Yes	32%	85%	15%
No	48%	75%	25%
Full Sample	41%	75%	25%

¹³ There is a handful of people who receive a civil judgment on their case *after* the end of supervision time period we observed (for example, they were on probation revoked to home detention and issued a civil judgment at the end of that executed time). Those individuals are included in the table above as receiving a civil judgment even though it did not occur until a later date. Removing those individuals from the count only changes the above figures by 1-3%.

Table 11 shows what percentage of people received civil judgments broken down by offense level, offense type, and indigency. Obviously, everyone who paid off their balance is not eligible for civil judgment. On average, 41% of the sample paid off their balance before the end of supervision. Put differently, the majority of people on supervision were not able to pay off their balance before the end of supervision.

Looking at Table 11, we see the highest percentages of people able to pay off their balances were those with misdemeanor offenses, non-property offenses (e.g., alcohol and drug or violent offenses), who were not assigned a public defender and were not declared indigent to fees.

59% of the sample did not pay off their balance at the end of supervision. Most of these clients (75%), across all characteristics, did not receive civil judgement. Individuals who received a civil judgment (given they also could not pay off their balances) were those who had misdemeanor offenses, property offenses, and were not declared indigent. Put differently, higher percentages of individuals who did not have serious offenses and who the court determined were able to pay received civil judgment.

RQ4. Analyses on the Impact of Fines and Fees on Negative Outcomes

Recall the fourth research question was that we would explore how fines, fees, and restitution impact various supervision outcomes. Specifically, are probationers/parolees who: 1) owe more in fines and fees and 2) have nonpayment of fines and fees more likely to: (1) receive sanctions (aka violations), (2) abscond, (3) have their sentences extended, or (4) have supervision revoked?

Descriptive Analyses. For each outcome, we first present how it varies by client risk level. Then, we show how that outcome varies by agency type, for example, urban probation

versus suburban probation. Finally, we show how the outcome varies by the amount the client has paid toward the fines, fees, and restitution they've been assessed.

Violation Rates. The main sanction in our state is a violation. Violations, or petitions filed with the court to revoke supervision, are relatively common across the state with over half of clients receiving at least one violation during their term of supervision. We see that most agencies fall within the range of 33-60% violation rates, apart from the rural community corrections agency with a violation rate of only 8%. Table 12 shows that the percentage of clients with a violation filed sometime during supervision increases with risk. We also see, in Table 12, that the urban agencies have higher percentages of clients receiving violations when compared to the suburban and rural agencies.

Table 12. <i>Violation by Risk</i>	
Risk Level	Percent with Violation Filed
Low	35%
Moderate	54%
High	64%
Very High	74%

Table 13. <i>Violations by Agency Type and Region</i>		
Agency Type	County Type	Percent with Violation Filed
Full Sample		51.1%
Probation		55.2%
	Urban	60.0%
	Suburban	48.0%
	Rural	33.8%
Community Corrections		44.1%
	Urban	47.1%
	Urban Privatized	37.3%
	Rural	8.3%
Parole		55.1%
	Region A	63.9%
	Region B	51.5%
	Region C	49.0%

Violation rates and failure to pay. When a violation is filed, it lists all the rules the client has broken to that date. However, we don't have access to this list of reasons for all our agencies. For those agencies who could provide this level of detail, we were able to see that they listed failure to pay (fine, fees, and/or restitution) commonly; at least half of the time it was listed as a reason in the suburban probation and urban community corrections agencies (tables not shown). However, parole and the rural community corrections agencies never listed failure to pay as a reason for violation. This is interesting in that all agencies are allowed by law to use failure to pay as a reason for filing a violation but not all are choosing to do so. By policy, agencies typically will not file a violation for failure to pay alone but will usually include it if other rules have been broken. That is, failure to pay rarely appears as the sole reason for a violation to be filed; it is generally listed alongside other noncompliant events.

Table 14.
Violation Rates by Amount Owed

Agency Type	County Type	Percent Violation Filed			Pearson Chi-Square
		No Balance Due	Some Balance Due	Full Balance Due	
Full Sample		45%	52%	64%	<.001
Probation		46%	81%	75%	<.001
	Urban	52%	81%	74%	<.001
	Suburban	19%	83%	83%	<.001
	Rural	36%	75%	50%	.527
Community Corrections		24%	40%	60%	<.001
	Urban	27%	41%	60%	<.001
	Urban Privatized	21%	44%	50%	.127
	Rural	0%	11%	0%	.850
Parole		51%	46%	61%	.152
	Region A	50%	36%	60%	.383
	Region B	45%	47%	51%	.870
	Region C	67%	50%	69%	.242

Table 14 gives us a descriptive look at the percent of clients who are receiving violations (for any reason) broken down into whether they have a \$0 balance due, some balance due, or a

full balance due. The balance is based on the end of supervision and includes all fines, court fees, supervision fees, and restitution combined. The balance also reflects both payments as well as waivers and adjustments. Overall, it appears violations are being filed more often for clients who have not paid all their financial responsibilities, although this seems to be driven by the urban probation, suburban probation, and urban community corrections agencies. Rural agency sample sizes are relatively small, which could be impacting results. However, the insignificance of balance due in parole aligns with lack of supervision fees and the lesser emphasis on fee collection in the policy reviews.

Revocation Rates. Similar to violations, we see the percentage of clients who are revoked increase as risk level increases (Table 15). Revocations are generally more common in probation than in community corrections and parole and rates vary widely across regions from 6-47% (Table 16). These revocations include events when a client is ordered to serve executed time and is released from supervision, events when a client is ordered to serve executed time and returns to supervision, and events when a client has served some executed time (for example, on a jail hold for a violation of probation) and receives credit for that time served at the end of supervision. In other words, what we are interested in here is if a client is ordered to serve executed time that was previously suspended, which indicates the court is sending them to jail for some type of shortcoming.

Table 15. <i>Revocation by Risk</i>	
Risk Level	Percent with Revocation
Low	17%
Moderate	30%
High	47%
Very High	55%

Table 16. <i>Revocations by Agency Type and Region</i>		
Agency Type	County Type	Percent with Revocation
Full Sample		32.5%
Probation		43.8%
	Urban	46.8%
	Suburban	32.0%
	Rural	5.6%
Community Corrections		28.8%
	Urban	33.1%
	Urban Privatized	12.0%
	Rural	4.2%
Parole		22.1%
	Region A	21.2%
	Region B	18.4%
	Region C	6.8%

Table 17. <i>Revocations by Balance Due</i>					
Agency Type	County Type	Percent with Revocation			Pearson Chi Square Sig.
		No Balance Due	Some Balance Due	Full Balance Due	
Full Sample		27%	32%	45%	<.001
Probation		31%	57%	71%	<.001
	Urban	39%	59%	70%	<.001
	Suburban	9%	54%	83%	<.001
	Rural	0%	33%	50%	<.001
Community Corrections		10%	24%	45%	<.001
	Urban	12%	27%	45%	<.001
	Urban Privatized	7%	10%	50%	.149
	Rural	0%	10%	0%	.85
Parole		20%	19%	25%	.55
	Region A	33%	27%	24%	.794
	Region B	19%	27%	27%	.66
	Region C	16%	0%	26%	.08

Table 17 gives us a descriptive look at the percent of clients who are having time revoked, broken down into whether they have a \$0 balance due, some balance due, or a full balance due. Again, keep in mind that these balances reflect both payments made, and waivers/adjustments received. Overall, it appears revocations are more common for clients who have not paid all their financial responsibilities, again driven by the probation agencies and the urban community corrections agencies. Interestingly, violation rates were not significant for the

rural probation agency, but revocation rates are. Among all agencies with significance, we see an increase in violation rate from no balance due to some balance due AND from some balance due to full balance due.

Absconding Rates. Aside from the “very high” risk population (which is a relatively small group), the percentage of clients who absconded during supervision increases slightly with risk (Table 18). Absconding varied across agencies (Table 19) which could have been affected by the agency’s way of tracking absconding; how quickly they were to mark someone as absconding in their database. Absconding was captured in our data when the officer marks a client as “absconding” or “missing” during supervision. This could occur at any point during supervision. Rates varied from 2% in the urban community corrections agency to over 30% in Parole Region C; no clear patterns between agency type or region are seen here.

Table 18. <i>Absconding by Risk</i>	
Risk Level	Percent with Absconson
Low	6%
Moderate	9%
High	12%
Very High	8%
<i>Note: No data available for urban or rural probation, as well as urban privatized or rural community corrections.</i>	

Table 19. <i>Absconding by Agency Type and Region</i>		
Agency Type	County Type	Percent with Absconson
Full Sample		5.1%
Probation	Urban	-
	Suburban	14.4%
	Rural	-
Community Corrections	Urban	1.9%
	Urban Privatized	-
	Rural	-
Parole		18.0%
	Region A	7.1%

Region B	16.3%
Region C	30.9%
<i>Note: No data available for urban or rural probation, as well as urban privatized or rural community corrections. Therefore, we also did not report overall rates for these agency types.</i>	

Table 20 gives us a descriptive look at the percent of clients who abscond, broken down into whether they have a \$0 balance due, some balance due, or a full balance due. We see slight increases in the rates of absconding in the urban community corrections agency and much larger differences in the rates of absconding for the suburban probation agency. Due to missingness in the data and insignificant results for the parole agencies, these are the only findings for this part of the data.

Agency Type	County Type	Percent with Absconsion			Pearson Chi-Square Sig.
		No Balance Due	Some Balance Due	Full Balance Due	
Full Sample		6.3%	6.1%	13.3%	.002
Probation		-	-	-	-
	Urban	-	-	-	-
	Suburban	1.6%	26.1%	41.7%	<.001
	Rural	-	-	-	-
Community Corrections		-	-	-	-
	Urban	0%	.4%	4.2%	.013
	Urban Privatized	-	-	-	-
	Rural	-	-	-	-
Parole		11.7%	15.4%	23.0%	.088
	Region A	26.7%	15.4%	36.7%	.149
	Region B	6.3%	9.1%	6.7%	.944
	Region C	12.9%	20.0%	18.6%	.761
<i>Note: No data available for urban or rural probation, as well as urban privatized or rural community corrections. Therefore, we also did not report overall rates for these agency types.</i>					

Extensions of supervision, rates. Extensions were defined as either (1) a client having a term of supervision that was longer than the original term of supervision or (2) their file indicated they had received a sanction of having their supervision term extended. Risk did not

have a discernible pattern with extension of supervision (Table 21). However, a higher percentage of clients who have a violation for a new offense receive an extended term of supervision (Table 22). This is likely due to the courts waiting on the new offense case to be decided prior to ending the term of supervision.

Table 21. <i>Extension by Risk</i>	
Risk Level	Percent with Extension
Low	20%
Moderate	26%
High	20%
Very High	19%
<i>Note: Extensions were not calculated for parole as there is not an originally sentenced amount of time to parole available in the dataset.</i>	

Table 22. <i>Extension by New Offense Presence</i>	
New Offense	Percent with Extension
New Offense Violation	36%
Technical Only Violation	20%
No Violation	10%
<i>Note: 44.5% of the sample is missing whether a violation is filed for new offense or technical only, ranging from 0% missing to 100% missing for each agency; percentage here are only reported for agencies with this information available.</i>	

Table 23. Extensions of Supervision by Agency Type and Region		
Agency Type	County Type	Percent with Extension
Full Sample		21.1%
Probation	Urban	21.6%
	Suburban	33.1%
	Rural	19.7%
		23.5%
Community Corrections	Urban	12.3%
	Urban Privatized	43.6%
	Rural	20.8%
		16.8%

Note: Extensions were not calculated for parole as there is not an originally sentenced amount of time to parole available in the dataset.

Table 23 shows us that extension rates varied across agency types and regions, but without any specific pattern. There was no significance in the crosstabulation of extension of supervision and balance due. This indicates, the extension of supervision is likely due to something other than nonpayment of financial obligations.

Summary Table. For the descriptive analyses, Table 24 summarizes whether payment status (i.e., no balance due, some balance due, full balance due) was significantly correlated with four negative outcomes: violation, revocation, absconding, or extension. In short, for the full sample, nonpayment is significantly correlated with three negative outcomes: absconding, violation, and revocation. Probation agencies and urban community corrections seem to be most strongly correlated with negative outcomes. Nonpayment does not seem to have much of an effect in parole.

Table 24.
Effects of Balance Due, Direct Effects Models^a

Agency Type	County Type	Violation	Revocation	Absconsion	Extension
Probation	Urban	Y	Y	-	N
	Suburban	Y	Y	Y	N
	Rural	N	Y	-	N
Community Corrections	Urban	Y	Y	N	N
	Urban Privatized	N	N	-	N
	Rural	N	N	-	N
Parole	Region A	N	N	N	-
	Region B	N	N	N	-
	Region C	N	N	N	-

Note:

^a Significance of $p < .001$

Predictive Analyses. To isolate the effect of the amount of monetary sanctions remaining at the end of the term of supervision on violation, controlling for other variables known to be associated with violation, we regressed violation on the set of control variables (see Table 25).¹⁴

Violations. Consistent with other research we have conducted, across all types of agencies, clients who are assessed to be high risk are most likely to receive a violation. Older clients have lower odds of receiving a violation, compared to younger clients. Offense type and gender were non-significant predictors of violation.

Proportion remaining in Table 25 was calculated by dividing the remaining balance due for all supervision fees, court fees and fines by the total amount assessed. Therefore, this could be reflective of both payments as well as waivers and adjustments to those monetary sanctions. Restitution was not included in this table due to the large variance in amount assessed. Even after controlling for these known predictors, the proportion of monetary sanctions remaining to be paid is a significant predictor of violations for probation. Individuals on probation who owe a higher proportion of monetary sanctions at the end of their supervision case have 3.5 times higher odds of receiving a violation than others.

Proportion remaining did not have the same predictive power for community corrections or parole, once the control variables were entered into the models.¹⁵

Table 25. <i>Logistic Regression Regressing Violation on Proportion Remaining^{a,b}</i>			
Measure	Probation	Community Corrections	Parole
	Odds ratio (Exp[β])	Odds Ratio (Exp[β])	Odds Ratio (Exp[β])
Race (Ref. White)			
Black	1.702*	0.934	0.944

¹⁴ Total assessed was not significant. in most models and not as strong a predictor of outcomes as proportion paid in all models).

¹⁵ We also looked at the predictive power of having a zero-dollar balance, but there was still no significance of those effects in community corrections or parole. These results can be seen in the appendices Table A6.

Other	0.644	2.190	0.840
Female (Ref. Male)	0.814	1.374	0.834
Age (in years)	0.971***	0.989	0.954***
Risk (Ref. Low Risk)			
Moderate Risk	3.205***	1.751	1.335
High Risk	5.061***	3.066***	2.122*
Offense Type (Ref. Property)			
Violent	0.891	0.799	0.636
Alcohol and Drug	0.868	0.867	0.951
Sex Offense	3.091	1.255	2.379
Other	0.715	1.170	0.539
Felony Offense (Ref. Misd)	1.225	1.846*	-. ^c
Proportion Remaining	3.500***	1.398	1.584
Constant	1.497	0.291**	3.660*
Likelihood ratio (-2 Log L)	589.914	635.808	332.777
<i>df</i>	12	12	12
<i>N</i>	533	494	263
<i>R</i> ²	0.296	0.117	0.145
<i>Notes:</i>			
^a Variables excluded: employment, education, income, supervision level, special caseload/caseload type, substance abuse and mental health diagnosis, dependent children, housing			
^b Sentence length (n.s. in all models)			
^c Removed because all but one case is a felony.			
*. <i>p</i> <.05. ** <i>p</i> <.01. *** <i>p</i> <.001			

Revocations, Absconding, and Extension of Supervision. We ran the same models as in Table 26 for three other outcomes: revocations, absconding, and extension of supervision. The results of these models can be found in the appendices (Tables A7, A8, and A9). To succinctly summarize results of the logistic regression analyses, we include a table of the full logistic regression models for each of the four outcomes regressed on various states of non-payment for fines and fees. The summary results are presented in Table 26 below.

The significant effects of the proportion of monetary sanctions due varied by the agency type. Individuals on probation who had a zero-dollar balance had lower odds for all negative outcomes: violation, revocation, absconsion and extension. That is, those who had paid off all of their financial responsibilities received fewer negative consequences than those who owed some or all of their monetary sanctions. For example, clients on probation who had no amount due had lower odds (0.289) of violation as compared to those with some amount due.

On the other hand, individuals on community corrections had greater odds of negative outcomes when they had a full balance due. That is, individuals who have made no payments to their monetary sanctions had twice the odds of both violation and revocation when compared to those who had paid at least some of their balance. Put differently, our findings indicate that people on probation must fully pay off their monetary sanctions to receive the same reduction in negative outcomes as people who've only paid partial balance in community corrections.

The relationship between proportion of fines and fees remaining and negative outcomes is not robust for parole clients.

Measure	Violations (y/n)	Revoked (y/n)	Abscond (y/n)	Extend Sentence (y/n)
Probation	N=533	N=533	N=115	N=532
<i>Full Amount Due</i>				
Fees and Fines Only	1.888	2.710**	3.693	1.702
Fees, Fines and Restitution	1.813	2.896***	3.693	1.821*
<i>No Amount Due</i>				
Fees and Fines Only	0.289***	0.375***	0.018**	0.415***
Fees, Fines and Restitution	0.275***	0.350***	0.018**	0.439***
<i>Proportion Owed</i>				
Fees and Fines Only	3.500***	3.809***	166.758***	2.374***
Fees, Fines and Restitution	3.931***	4.143***	206.102***	2.343***
Community Corrections	N=494	N=494	N=419^a	N=425
<i>Full Amount Due</i>				
Fees and Fines Only	2.163***	2.238***	-	1.030
Fees, Fines and Restitution	2.113***	2.248***	-	1.052
<i>No Amount Due</i>				
Fees and Fines Only	0.535	0.423*	-	0.584
Fees, Fines and Restitution	0.518	0.375*	-	0.591
<i>Proportion Owed</i>				
Fees and Fines Only	1.398	2.428**	-	1.144
Fees, Fines and Restitution	1.325	2.385**	-	1.124
Parole	N=263	N=263	N=263	N=263^b
<i>Full Amount Due</i>				

Fees and Fines Only	1.413	1.390	2.407*	-
Fees, Fines and Restitution	1.485	1.202	2.123*	-
<i>No Amount Due</i>				
Fees and Fines Only	0.841	0.828	0.534	-
Fees, Fines and Restitution	0.851	0.862	0.515	-
<i>Proportion Owed</i>				
Fees and Fines Only	1.584	1.454	2.320*	-
Fees, Fines and Restitution	1.647	1.358	2.244*	-

Notes:

Control variables include: Risk Level, Offense Level (except for Parole where all clients have felony offenses), Offense Type, Race, Gender and Age

^a *Community Corrections only had nine people abscond, which was not enough to run the 'abscond' model.*

^b *Parole did not have data for extended sentences.*

<.05 Sig. **<.01 Sig. *<.001 Sig.*

Table 27 gives us a summary of the significant effects of the proportion of monetary sanctions on each of the four negative outcomes: violation, revocation, absconsion and extension. We see that not paying off all of the assessed monetary sanctions has real consequences for clients, especially in probation and community corrections.

Table 27. <i>Effects of Balance Due, After Controlling for Known Predictors</i>				
Agency Type	Violation	Revocation	Absconsion	Extension
Probation	Y	Y	Y	Y
Community Corrections	Y	Y	--	N
Parole	N	N	Y	--

Conclusion

This study collected agency data in the state of Indiana for three different types of supervision agencies (probation, community corrections, and parole) in three different types of locations (urban, suburban, and rural). We answered four central research questions. First, we found that individuals who pay the most in combined monetary sanctions are clients of community corrections. They pay almost \$3,000 (see Figure 2) whereas probation clients, on average, pay \$1,882, and parole clients pay \$1,364. As expected, monetary sanctions are higher

for more serious offenses, particularly offense types that indicate need for treatment (e.g., alcohol-related, drug-related, sex-related). These are significant costs for clients. Our data show that approximately half of supervision clients are unable to pay off these monetary sanctions before leaving supervision.

Our next question explored what options exist for clients who are unable to pay their monetary sanctions. Specifically, we learned that individuals who are charged the most in monetary sanctions – those on community corrections – are least likely to receive waivers and adjustments. If an individual is able to obtain a waiver of adjustment, they usually receive approximately \$250 to \$300 for court fees and about \$375 for supervision fees. This amounts to about 58% of the total assessment.

Regarding expenditures, we found that clients in the Indiana court system paid for 39% of court expenditures in the forms of user fees and fines. That is a significant amount of a budget to be covered by user fees; it raises concerns about an agency's ability to be solvent without client revenue. Urban counties seem to rely the least on fees, at 25% of expenditures funded by user fees. The "Rural Counties with Larger Towns" seem to be the most reliant on fees, at almost 40%.

In response to our third research question, we found that when clients of community supervision still owed money at the end of their supervision period, they received civil judgments about 25-33% of the time independent of offense characteristics, which is a relatively low frequency rate. We examined whether people with more serious offenses, for example, were less likely to receive a civil judgment but found offense type was independent of whether one received a civil judgment.

Finally, fourth, we found that controlling for known predictors, inability to pay off monetary sanctions is significantly related to negative outcomes such as absconding behavior, receiving an extension to one's term of supervision, receiving a violation, and even being revoked, for certain types of supervision agencies. Probation and community corrections clients are the most impacted by nonpayment of monetary sanctions. Clients of parole receive fewer negative outcomes. Thus, monetary sanctions are consequential and negative for clients on supervision.

Appendices

		Employment Unemployed	Missing	Education HS/GED or >	Missing
Full Sample	Probation	37.2%	77.6%	83.6%	76.4%
	Community Corrections	47.4%	15.9%	82.6%	96.0%
	Parole	33.2%	12.9%	76.1%	3.1%
Suburban	Probation	33.6%	5.6%	87.1%	0.8%
Urban	Probation	-	100%	-	100%
	Comm Corr – County	48.2%	0%	-	100%
	Comm Corr – Privatized	-	100%	-	100%
Rural	Probation	42.1%	46.5%	74.5%	33.8%
	Comm Corr	25.0%	33.3%	82.6%	4.2%
Mixed Suburban /Rural	Parole A	25.6%	9.1%	77.2%	7.1%
	Parole B	30.0%	18.4%	75.3%	1.0%
Mixed Urban/ Suburban/Rural	Parole C	39.2%	11.3%	76.0%	1.0%

Note: Unemployed % does not include those who are retired, disabled, or full-time students.

Measure	Probation	Community Corrections
	Odds ratio (Exp[β])	Odds Ratio (Exp[β])
Race (Ref. White)		
Black	0.614	0.927
Other	0.892	1.613
Female (Ref. Male)	0.836	1.286
Age (in years)	1.033	0.977
Risk (Ref. Low Risk)		
Moderate Risk	0.434	1.505
High Risk	0.637	1.487
Offense Type (Ref. Property)		
Violent	1.195	1.435
Alcohol and Drug	1.110	2.418
Sex Offense	0.967	-
Other	1.109	2.801
Felony Offense (Ref. Misd)	0.640	2.102
Constant	10.330***	9.746**
Likelihood ratio (-2 Log)	454.914	195.363
N	549	496

R ²	0.039	0.017
Note: *. <i>p</i> <.05. ** <i>p</i> <.01. *** <i>p</i> <.001		

Table A3.
Regression Predicting Court Fees Assessed Y/N

Measure	Probation	Community Corrections	Parole
	Odds ratio (Exp[β])	Odds Ratio (Exp[β])	Odds Ratio (Exp[β])
Race (Ref. White)			
Black	0.533*	0.750	0.361*
Other	0.759	2.364	0.475
Female (Ref. Male)	0.616	0.566*	4.811
Age (in years)	0.975*	0.995	0.987
Risk (Ref. Low Risk)			
Moderate Risk	0.629	0.596	0.373
High Risk	0.631	0.509*	0.998
Offense Type (Ref. Property)			
Violent	1.886	3.689***	0.683
Alcohol and Drug	5.160***	3.417***	2.982
Sex Offense	2.402	1.420	0.913
Other	1.644	2.202*	0.648
Felony Offense (Ref. Misd)	0.307	0.525*	- ^a
Constant	11.082***	3.432*	21.653**
Likelihood ratio (-2 Log)	446.703	606.488	158.798
<i>N</i>	545	522	270
R ²	0.110	0.121	0.075
Notes: ^a Felony not included for Parole as nearly all cases are felony offenses *. <i>p</i> <.05. ** <i>p</i> <.01. *** <i>p</i> <.001			

Table A4.
Regression Predicting Fines Assessed Y/N

Measure	Probation	Community Corrections	Parole
	Odds ratio (Exp[β])	Odds Ratio (Exp[β])	Odds Ratio (Exp[β])
Race (Ref. White)			
Black	2.533*	0.500*	0.569
Other	1.548	0.168	0.498
Female (Ref. Male)	0.509	0.815	0.877
Age (in years)	1.010	1.005	0.994
Risk (Ref. Low Risk)			
Moderate Risk	0.853	0.714	1.332
High Risk	0.110**	0.432*	2.009
Offense Type (Ref. Property)			
Violent	2.829	2.999*	0.167
Alcohol and Drug	1.458	1.704	1.749
Sex Offense	7.081	1.838	0.721

Other	0.697	3.229*	0.733
Felony Offense (Ref. Misd)	3.146*	0.815	-. ^a
Constant	0.015***	0.130**	0.145*
Likelihood ratio (-2 Log)	185.720	318.027	205.487
<i>N</i>	545	522	270
<i>R</i> ²	0.052	0.038	0.050
<i>Notes:</i>			
^a Felony not included for Parole as nearly all cases are felony offenses			
*. <i>p</i> <.05. ** <i>p</i> <.01. *** <i>p</i> <.001			

Table A5.			
<i>Regression Predicting Restitution Assessed Y/N</i>			
Measure	Probation	Community Corrections	Parole
	Odds ratio (Exp[β])	Odds Ratio (Exp[β])	Odds Ratio (Exp[β])
Race (Ref. White)			
Black	0.571	0.612	1.140
Other	1.331	0.277	1.457
Female (Ref. Male)	1.290	0.458	0.743
Age (in years)	0.993	0.997	1.019
Risk (Ref. Low Risk)			
Moderate Risk	0.798	0.657	0.510
High Risk	0.949	0.366*	0.499
Offense Type (Ref. Property)			
Violent	0.249**	0.305**	0.284**
Alcohol and Drug	0.101***	0.068***	0.149***
Sex Offense	0.000	0.000	0.000
Other	0.087***	0.153***	0.130***
Felony Offense (Ref. Misd)	1.163	0.891	-. ^a
Constant	0.628	1.147	0.863
Likelihood ratio (-2 Log)	291.543	264.322	243.124
<i>N</i>	545	522	276
<i>R</i> ²	0.090	0.094	0.169
<i>Notes:</i>			
^a Felony not included for Parole as nearly all cases are felony offenses			
*. <i>p</i> <.05. ** <i>p</i> <.01. *** <i>p</i> <.001			

Table A6.			
<i>Regression Regressing Violation on Zero Dollar Balance Remaining^a</i>			
Measure	Probation	Community Corrections	Parole
	Odds ratio (Exp[β])	Odds Ratio (Exp[β])	Odds Ratio (Exp[β])
Race (Ref. White)			
Black	1.822**	0.936	0.905
Other	0.747	2.378	0.815
Female (Ref. Male)	0.811	1.370	0.858
Age (in years)	0.973**	0.988	0.956**
Risk (Ref. Low Risk)			

Moderate Risk	3.352***	1.727	1.384
High Risk	4.844***	3.130***	2.340*
Offense Type (Ref. Property)			
Violent	0.996	0.773	0.623
Alcohol and Drug	0.981	0.838	0.949
Sex Offense	3.847	1.122	2.370
Other	0.769	1.128	0.518
Felony Offense (Ref. Misd)	1.257	1.819*	-. ^b
Zero Dollar Balance Remaining^c	0.275***	0.518	0.856
Constant	3.915**	0.405	-
Likelihood ratio (-2 Log L)	577.768	634.194	332.397
<i>df</i>	12	12	12
<i>N</i>	533	494	262
<i>R</i> ²	0.237	0.091	0.105
<i>Notes:</i>			
^a Variables excluded: employment, education, income, supervision level, special caseload/caseload type, substance abuse and mental health diagnosis, dependent children, housing			
^b Removed because all but one case is a felony.			
^c Zero balance remaining for court fees, supervision fees, fines, and restitution			
*. <i>p</i> <.05. ** <i>p</i> <.01. *** <i>p</i> <.001			

Table A7.

Logistic Regression Regressing Revocation on Proportion Remaining^a

Measure	Probation	Community Corrections	Parole
	Odds ratio (Exp[β])	Odds Ratio (Exp[β])	Odds Ratio (Exp[β])
Race (Ref. White)			
Black	2.534***	0.936	1.108
Other	0.521	1.719	1.296
Female (Ref. Male)	0.696	0.897	0.583
Age (in years)	0.976**	0.983	0.994
Risk (Ref. Low Risk)			
Moderate Risk	2.255***	2.737*	1.567
High Risk	7.049***	6.123***	2.549*
Offense Type (Ref. Property)			
Violent	0.997	0.545	0.777
Alcohol and Drug	0.641	0.609	0.583
Sex Offense	8.241	3.175	2.897*
Other	0.400*	1.111	1.296
Felony Offense (Ref. Misd)	1.030	1.624	-. ^b
Proportion Remaining^c	3.809***	2.428**	1.454
Constant	0.617	0.093***	0.194*
Likelihood ratio (-2 Log L)	551.572	525.584	257.357
<i>df</i>	1	1	1
<i>N</i>	533	494	263
<i>R</i> ²	0.374	0.198	0.126
<i>Notes:</i>			

^a Variables excluded: employment, education, income, supervision level, special caseload/caseload type, substance abuse and mental health diagnosis, dependent children, housing

^b Removed because all but one case is a felony.

^c Proportion remaining for court fees, supervision fees, and fines; restitution excluded.

*. $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

Table A8.		
<i>Logistic Regression Predicting Absconding^{a, b}</i>		
Measure	Probation	Parole
	Odds ratio (Exp[β])	Odds Ratio (Exp[β])
Race (Ref. White)		
Black	0.404	0.459
Other	2.207	1.106
Female (Ref. Male)	0.865	0.796
Age (in years)	0.942	1.008
Risk (Ref. Low Risk)		
Moderate Risk	4.137	2.494
High Risk	0.723	4.383*
Offense Type (Ref. Property)		
Violent	0.000	0.334
Alcohol and Drug	2.052	0.631
Sex Offense	0.000	0.201*
Other	0.237	1.106
Felony Offense (Ref. Misd)	1.232	-. ^c
Proportion Remaining^d	166.758***	2.302*
Constant	0.087	0.064**
Likelihood ratio (-2 Log L)	57.408	219.500
<i>df</i>	1	1
<i>N</i>	115	263
<i>R</i> ²	0.531	0.146
<i>Notes:</i>		
^a Community Corrections not included due to missing data		
^b Variables excluded: employment, education, income, supervision level, special caseload/caseload type, substance abuse and mental health diagnosis, dependent children, housing		
^c Removed because all but one case is a felony.		
^d Proportion remaining for court fees, supervision fees, and fines; restitution excluded.		
*. $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$		

Table A9.		
<i>Logistic Regression Predicting Extension^{a, b}</i>		
Measure	Probation	Community Corrections
	Odds Ratio (Exp[β])	Odds Ratio (Exp[β])
Race (Ref. White)		
Black	0.674	1.013
Other	1.160	0.790
Female (Ref. Male)	1.651*	1.176
Age (in years)	0.995	0.996

Risk (Ref. Low Risk)		
Moderate Risk	2.377***	0.9904
High Risk	1.637	0.871
Offense Type (Ref. Property)		
Violent	0.526	1.636
Alcohol and Drug	1.102	2.617*
Sex Offense	0.000	0.000
Other	1.160	2.230
Felony Offense (Ref. Misd)	0.568*	0.986
Proportion Remaining^c	2.403***	1.200
Constant	0.292**	0.091**
Likelihood ratio (-2 Log L)	570.375	335.174
<i>df</i>	1	1
<i>N</i>	531	425
<i>R</i> ²	0.112	0.030
<i>Notes:</i>		
^a Parole not included due to missing data.		
^b Variables excluded: employment, education, income, supervision level, special caseload/caseload type, substance abuse and mental health diagnosis, dependent children, housing		
^c Proportion remaining for court fees, supervision fees, and fines; restitution excluded.		
*. <i>p</i> <.05. ** <i>p</i> <.01. *** <i>p</i> <.001		