Yes, the court should rule in favor of Morel as he has a strong case for copyright infringement against AFP. While, yes, Twitpic’s terms of service read, in part, “By [uploading content], you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such content in any and all media or distribution methods.” This extends solely to Twitpic as a company. There is no evidence that this is meant to extend to third parties (i.e., AFP) who come across the photo on the platform and wish to use it for their own purposes. Further, because Morel is the copyright holder, he has the exclusive right to control the use and distribution of his artwork unless he grants a license to another party.

It’s worth mentioning that individuals are allowed to post photographs on a public website without automatically granting a license to third parties to use the photographs without permission. McGucken v. Newsweek LLC, 464 F. Supp. 3d 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). This ruling seemingly weakens AFP’s defense as they were granted permission before carelessly distributing copies of the photographs to CBS, CNN, and other news outlets. Additionally, from a public policy standpoint, it would be problematic to rule in favor of AFP as it would (1) make artists hesitate to share their work online as they have no defense to stop others from using their art in a way that goes against who they are or what they see as appropriate and (2) leave them without remedy or compensation when larger companies inevitably profit off of their art.

The court may likely rule for summary judgment in favor of National Airlines on its breach of contract but not on its trespass of chattel and violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claims.

Regarding the breach of contract claim, National’s website clearly states that by using the website, one is accepting the Terms and Conditions set forth by the airline, which prohibit using their website for commercial purposes unless they are an approved National travel agent. LineJump’s business of using National’s website to secure A boarding passes for their customers obviously fall under commercial activity and, thus, leaves them liable to the breach of contract claim.

However, the other two claims may not be the “slam dunk” needed to justify summary judgment. This is not to say that LineJump’s activities don’t constitute trespass to chattels. It very well might. But, to satisfy electronic trespass to the chattel, it must be shown that the party intentionally interfered with another person’s property. Intel Corporation v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342 (2003). It’s unclear if LineJump substantially interfered with National Airlines to trigger trespass to chattel. Therefore, neither party’s motion for summary judgment should be granted.

National’s claim that LineJump violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) is also unclear. The CFAA prohibits unauthorized access to a computer system. Here, National is arguing that LineJump’s use of the website constitutes such unauthorized access. However, LineJump obtained access to the website the way anyone else would. By having a real person log in and provide their, very real, information, even if it was for a commercial purpose. There is no clear evidence to show that LineJump’s access was “unauthorized.” Therefore, there is no reason for the court to grant National’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.

In actuality, I don’t believe a court would grant any of these motions for summary judgment. Instead, they would let it go to court because none of the claims are biased for either party.

Due to the sheer magnitude of problems caused by the “bugs,” FixPoint is incredibly vulnerable to legal liability against the University of Helsinki. Intel v. Hamidi holds electronic trespass of chattels occurs only when there has been “some actual or threatened interference with the computers’ functioning with the possession.” 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 71 P.3d 296 (2003). In Intel, Intel Corporation sued a former employee for sending mass email messages critical of Intel’s employment practices to current employees. The case went to the California Supreme Court, which ruled that Hamidi’s actions did not constitute trespass to chattels, as the emails, even if unwanted, did not physically interfere with Intel’s computer systems. Intel differs from FixPoint, however, as the bug in the WX11N software actually interfered with the University’s systems.

Further, The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 218 states that:

“Liability to Person in Possession One who commits a trespass to a chattel is subject to liability to the possessor of the chattel if, but only if, (a) he dispossesses the other of the chattel, or (b) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or (c) the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or (d) bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest.”

It is clear that the system becoming backed up by hundreds of thousands of queries that would then cause the University’s system to repeatedly crash were due to a bug in the WX11N software. Thus, leaving FixPoint, specifically under § 218(b) and § 218(c), as the bug impaired the University’s system for its quality and for a substantial amount of time.

During a meeting with the engineers (along with yelling at them), I would ask (1) just how this happened multiple times without being caught and (2) can the software be patched quickly to possibly resolve the problem before a suit is brought and if not, what can we do to fix the issue.

This is why you have to watch your kids carefully. This problem hit me close to home for me. My mother actually had a similar thing happen with my sister due to her obsession with the hit comedy shows, Malcolm in the Middle and Young Sheldon. In the span of two months, my sister has successfully bought every episode of both shows on Amazon Prime, either season-by-season or even episode-by-episode. I can only imagine how high that month’s credit card bill was; honestly, I don’t want to know. But I asked my mom why she didn’t do anything to get her money back, and she said, “Well, it’s my account, and I’m one who wasn’t paying enough attention to stop her. So it’s not like Amazon did anything wrong.” And she’s right. It’s entirely her fault that this happened, not Amazon’s. The same logic applies here and because of that, the Griffins’ lawsuit wouldn’t be successful.

iTunes Store’s terms and conditions clearly state that the account holder is solely responsible for maintaining the confidentiality and security of their account and that they’re responsible for all activities that occur on their account. Lois gave her password to Stewart, thereby authorizing him to make the purchases. Therefore, the responsibility for the unauthorized purchases lies with Lois, not Capcom and Apple. Further, this could have been prevented by Lois enabling parental controls on her account to prevent unauthorized purchases. Still, because she didn’t, Stewart could buy as many Smurfberries as his heart desired without permission.

These facts make it unlikely for a court to hold Apple and/or Capcom liable for the unauthorized purchases made on her account. Of course, Lois may be able to dispute the purchase with her bank or set up a plan with her credit card issuer. But for the court case, I don’t think it will lead anywhere.

While arguments could be made for both sides, I  believe that using the hashtag “MayThe4th” might be sufficient enough to bind a Twitter user to Disney’s Terms of Services only if one can prove that the user was aware of the tweet made by Disney or saw it themselves before using the hashtag. Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc. ruled that a smartphone app user has reasonably conspicuous notice of the app’s terms of service if a reasonably prudent user would have known about the terms and the conduct that would be required to assent to them. 868 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2017). Further, courts have often found that regular internet users, more than likely, understand and comprehend that they agree with a website’s terms when using it. Meyer.

Here, if one were to see Disney’s tweet, which plainly states that by using the hashtag, they are agreeing to their terms of use; it may be enough to satisfy both notice and assent. But, that may not be the case for many users, especially if the hashtag goes viral, which would make it difficult for users to track down the original tweet or the user doesn’t follow Disney. They would have no knowledge of Disney’s terms before using the hashtag, and if they don’t have the knowledge, they can’t be bound to the agreement.

On the technical side, the first step we may want to consider is whether we have the ability to track down the IP addresses associated with “Ian” and the “eatmyjukt” email address. Unless it is encrypted (which will then require additional steps), you can learn just about anything about a particular person by their IP address, including their location, their internet provider, and yes, even their name and address. However, if “Ian” used anything to hide this information, such as a proxy or encryption, this would take a little more time to track down, but it is by no means impossible. And because it assumed that “Ian” is a possibly underaged amateur, it shouldn’t be difficult for a multi-million dollar company like ours to crack and track down. However, this makes me wonder if we should cover our own bases legally by researching what we can uncover from someone’s IP address without approval from a court.

Legally, however, the FBI will be able to change Ian through § 2703 of the Stored Communications Act as he (or they) “intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided or … intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system shall be punished … .” However, before charging “Ian,” the FBI will have to track him down, which can be done by obtaining a warrant to compel Hiert to turn over any information it has on the “eatmyjukt” account. With the information already obtained, it seems as though both avenues may succeed as “Ian” overstepped numerous boundaries while attempting to extort Jukt Micronics for hundreds of millions of dollars.

The key to “playing the game” when it comes to policies you disagree with isn’t to say “the representative/senator is wrong” or “the bill is a terrible idea” but to simply “voice your concerns” when it comes to the proposed bill. This was a lesson I learned very early on during my time as a Legislative and Constituent Services intern for the Indiana House of Representatives. That said, I have more than a few concerns regarding the bill proposed by Senator Abbott (R-TX). First, It is imperative for those put into positions of power to do what they can to protect their country from threats, both foreign and domestic. However, the proposed bill, while noble, may be misguided in its execution in its current form.

Our mission at the SETEC is to “keep the internet open, free, and safe,” and the proposed bill goes, not only, against the mission of the organization but also against the very core of the United States Constitution. The bill will make it as though the government is, seemingly, in control of the internet and its users. And this concerns me. Allowing the government to keep a “secret key,” which can access all communications had by citizens at any given time, is tearing apart Americans’ right to privacy. Moreover, the caveat that law enforcement will need to obtain a court order seems like nothing more than a formality that will likely be used and abused by those in power.

By requiring all telephones and Internet connections in the U.S. to be built with Zipper, the bill not only creates the possibility of Zipper creating a monopoly over encryption but also makes so if the very threats Senator Abbott is attempting to deter from spying on Americans are able to hack the Zipper program, they will have access to absolutely everything and everyone. Thus, contradicting the very purpose of the bill.

Generally, a warrant is required for law enforcement to conduct a search of a computer or any other electronic device. The Fourth Amendment requires that the warrant (1) establishes probable cause, (2) through Oath or affirmation, (3) particularly describes what is being searched, and (4) particularity describes what is to be seized. Additionally, a warrant that is deficient or defective on particularity may invalidate the warrant in a subsequent search. Groh v. Ramirez. 

In this scenario, law enforcement solely asked for a warrant to search the computer for evidence of CSAM. This search could cover a search of his photos, documents, hidden/encrypted files, browsing history, and, yes, possibly, his emails. However, I am not 100% convinced, as emails and someone’s email account can tell anyone an awful lot about that person within a small amount of time.

Nevertheless, of the three options given: (1) the tax records, (2) emails, and (3) patient records from his psychiatric practice, the emails are the only thing that might be able to be examined by police with their current warrant.

There is no reason to look for evidence of tax evasion with the current warrant, as it has nothing to do with the crime of CSAM possession. However, if officers want to look through his tax records for evidence of tax evasion, they can get another warrant (or amend the current warrant) to do so.

But, under no reasonable circumstance should officers be allowed to rifle through Maplewood’s patient records. Forget about Maplewood’s right to privacy; this is a huge invasion of his patients’ privacy, who have nothing to do with this. There is no reasonable belief that going through these files will reveal anything related to the change of possession.

While there’s no set time limit for how long officers may keep ahold of evidence, I believe, it’s best practice to only keep it for as long as necessary to search through the items covered under the warrant. For something of this magnitude, it may be helpful to bring in experts to help accelerate this process and make sure officers do not go outside the warrant’s scope.

Ah, how I love the Fourth Amendment, and reading this chapter threw me right back to Criminal Procedure: Investigation. And, if there is anything I remember from that course, it’s the fact that, usually, police cannot search the contents of someone’s digital device (i.e., a phone, tablet, etc.) without a warrant. However, the rules that dictate exceptions rely on whether the person, in this case, Dom, was arrested.

If he were, the “Chimel” rule would apply, in which an officer may search the area within the immediate control of the arrestee, known as the “grab lunge area,” to prevent the arrestee from (1) reaching for/grabbing a weapon or (2) destroying evidence. Examples of the “immediate control of the arrestee” can include the floor of the car, the glovebox, maybe the back of the driver’s seat. This does not extend to the technology found inside the car, such as the “black box.” Going through the two prongs of Chimel, it’s clear that the black box can’t be used as a weapon or used to physically harm the officer.  So the question may fall to the second prong: “is there a chance that Toretto could destroy the evidence on the black box?” And the answer is: not really.

However, Toretto wasn’t arrested. He was hospitalized for the injuries he sustained from the accident. So, would Riley and Chimel even apply? I’m not so sure. So, we may need to fall back to one of the “OG” search and seizure cases, Katz v. United States, in which the Court ruled the 4th Amendment protects a person from unreasonable searches and seizures IF they had a “reasonable expectation of privacy” or “one that society deems as reasonable.”  389 U.S. 347 (1967). I think it’s fair to assume that Dom had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the information on the black box. It’s reasonable to assume that police wouldn’t stifle through your technology’s data, making this an unreasonable search.

Further, the fact that to obtain/decode the information on the black box would require specialized software that’s only available to mechanics certified by the car’s manufacturer shows that this goes way outside the scope of what is allowed by a warrantless search conducted by police.

So, sadly, officers will need to obtain a warrant before going through with their search of the black box. But have no fear! The evidence on the Black Box is more than likely not going anywhere unless Torrento’s family can destroy the evidence on it before officers can obtain a warrant.

Section 230 protects online platforms from being held responsible for any illegal/ harmful information posted by their users. Thus, seemingly barring Cohen’s suit against Brightside. However, 18 U.S.C. 2339 makes it illegal to knowingly provide material support/resources to terrorist organizations. They don’t need to intend to support the organization’s activities; one must simply know that group is a terrorist organization.

Is a social media account a resource? I believe so. The organization was able to (1) reach millions of people through its accounts and (2) communicate with each other. That is definitely a resource.

Jones held that materially contributing to illegality creates responsibility. One may argue that Brightside didn’t have reason to know of the organization. However, this is weakened by the fact that the organization and its leaders brazenly identified themselves, posted about their activities, and that Brightside received notice as early as 2016 identifying these accounts as a part of a terrorist organization. There is no reason to believe that Brightside didn’t know.

So, while Brightside may seem immune, this is not the case, as they illegally provided a resource to a terrorist organization. And because of this, they can be held responsible, and thus, Section 230 does not bar Cohen’s against the platform.