INTERGROUP EMOTIONS

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One of the most powerful ideas in contemporary social psychology is that the self is defined largely in terms of group memberships. This idea is grounded in social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and is developed most clearly in self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Social identity theory postulates that all social entities, including the self, can be seen as members of social groups and that groups are therefore an important source of identity for individuals. Social categorization into groups, like all categorization processes, highlights the similarities within groups and the differences among them. Self-categorization theory describes the process of shifting to see the self in terms of membership in a salient group with which one also identifies (Turner et al., 1987). Self-categorization causes people to think of themselves as having the characteristics associated with group membership, a process called self-stereotyping, which leads group members to perceive themselves as interchangeable exemplars of the group rather than as unique individuals (E. R. Smith & Henry, 1996; Turner et al., 1987). In this way, in-group memberships, or social identities, become part of the self. This redefinition of the self in terms of membership in groups with which one identifies imbues in-groups with evaluative significance and empowers them to influence thoughts, feelings, and actions in both intragroup and intergroup contexts.

The influence of this social identity perspective in the contemporary understanding of intergroup relations is impossible to exaggerate. Almost all social psychological models of stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup conflict assume, rely on, or refer to the processes of social categorization, group identification, and self-stereotyping (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Paluck & Green, 2009; Swann & Bosson, 2010; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010; Chapter 8, this volume). Very much in this tradition, this chapter deals with the emotional consequences of these processes and with the powerful and specific effect on intergroup relations of the emotions generated by these processes. Although it has been argued that social identity theory itself is an incipient theory of emotion (Spears et al., 2011), emotions received relatively little emphasis in the early intergroup research generated by social identity theory. As researchers rediscovered the importance of emotions for intergroup relations, the social identity perspective provided a general framework for a wide range of research programs that explored emotional responses to a wide range of intergroup objects or contexts (see Iyer & Leach, 2009; Parkinson, Fisher, & Manstead, 2005; E. R. Smith & Mackie, 2008, 2010a, 2010b; E. R. Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007; Spears et al., 2011, for reviews).

This chapter focuses specifically on the emotions that result from self-categorization and social identity—in other words, emotions that are felt because of group membership—as first explicitly articulated by E. R. Smith (1993). By definition then, emotions one feels as a unique individual are

not the focus of this chapter, although they do provide an important point of comparison. It also is not concerned with shared emotions that arise as a function of interpersonal contagion processes triggered by being in the physical presence of others (Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012, reserve the term *group emotion* for such phenomena). The chapter is not referring to emotions about one's own membership in a group (e.g., individual feelings of pride at being admitted to a prestigious group or individual fear of being asked to leave a group). This chapter is concerned instead with emotions that causally depend on self-categorization, that occur whether or not the group is physically present, and that reflect group-level rather than interpersonal processes.

We coined the term *intergroup emotion* (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000) and developed *intergroup emotion theory* (IET; Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2009; Mackie, Silver, & Smith, 2004; Mackie & Smith, 2002; E. R. Smith & Mackie, 2006, 2008; E. R. Smith et al., 2007) to describe systematically the uniquely group-level nature of the categorization, identification, and appraisal antecedents of intergroup emotions as well as their consequences for intergroup relations. The term intergroup emotion reflects the basic tenets of social identity and self-categorization theory: that group categorization is always socially comparative between and among groups, that the meaning of an in-group is always defined in reference to currently salient out-groups and vice versa, and that social categorization itself is inherently a group-level phenomenon.

As we developed and refined IET, other theories and research approaches sharing the same approach and goals also were being advanced. For example, Yzerbyt and colleagues developed a model of group-based emotions, which they defined as emotions that result from group-based appraisals influenced by a salient social identity (Gordijn, Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 2001; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Gordijn, & Wigboldus, 2002; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Mathieu, Gordijn, & Wigboldus, 2006; Yzerbyt & Kuppens, 2009). Another important line of work, primarily focused on guilt at the group level, has used the term *collective emotion* to reflect individuals' feelings based on their membership in a collective or group (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998, 2006).

Many researchers have used multiple terms interchangeably in developing research about particular emotions experienced toward the in-group or out-group or in a particular context (e.g., Bar-Tal, Halperin, & de Rivera, 2007; Kessler & Hollbach, 2005; Spears & Leach, 2004; Spears et al., 2011).

Although the use of these various terms might at times reflect important theoretical differences, this chapter focuses primarily on the impressive amount of research evidence supporting the principles they have in common: that categorization and identification processes generate group-level appraisals and thus group-based emotions about anything relevant to that membership and that such emotions in turn have pervasive effects on intergroup behavior. Given this emphasis on commonalities, we use the terms categorization-based, group-based, or intergroup emotions interchangeably, unless it is important theoretically not to do so. Our inclusive approach is consistent with Niedenthal and Brauer's (2012) general definition of group-based emotion as emotion that individuals have on behalf of a group to which they belong and resulting from identification with this group, even when they are not in the group's presence and even when they are not in a situation that is the elicitor of the emotion.

The first part of the chapter describes and reviews the impressive evidence that has accumulated for the truly group-level nature of categorization-based emotions. The next three sections describe research that focuses on the functionality of social categorization-based emotions in regulating intergroup relations. Much of the research that takes a categorization approach to emotions focuses on how such emotions promote intergroup conflict (reviewed in the third section). The chapter then summarizes the significant body of evidence that confirms the ways in which these emotions also can facilitate intergroup reconciliation. Finally, the chapter sketches out some of the many new directions in which these research approaches are developing.

INTERGROUP EMOTION AS A GROUP-LEVEL PHENOMENON

By emphasizing that emotion can be rooted in the process of redefining the self as a group member,

IET and other similar approaches stake the claim for emotions as group-level phenomena, driven by group-level processes, such as social categorization and identification. Most group-based emotion theories focus on real-time appraisal of group-relevant objects, events, and situations. Such appraisals are also group based, being a consequence of social categorization: events, entities (including the in-group and out-groups and their members), and situations are appraised, construed, or interpreted in terms of their implications for the group rather than for the individual self. For example, a self-categorized student reading that state officials plan to raise university fees might generate intergroup appraisals about the fee hike itself as well as appraisals about the state officials proposing the increase (an out-group) and the students who will suffer its consequences (the in-group). Consistent with appraisal theories of individual emotions, particular patterns of such group-based appraisals are assumed to produce the subjective experience of a wide range of distinct group-level emotions about any or all of these targets, indeed about anything relevant to the salient social identity.

In addition to investigating these situation- or object-specific appraisals and emotions, we have argued that repeated appraisal of group-relevant events, situations, and objects also can result in more stable profiles of intergroup emotion becoming associated with membership in a particular group, so that group-based appraisals or the resultant emotions might be activated and accepted via self-stereotyping upon self-categorization (Mackie et al., 2004; Moons, Leonard, Mackie, & Smith, 2009; E. R. Smith et al., 2007). For example, someone who frequently thinks of his or her nation as a supreme symbol of freedom and justice frequently might feel group-based pride, which could become associated with the person's national identity.

Regardless of whether it arises directly from category activation or is mediated by appraisal, categorization-based emotion is a group-level phenomenon. We review five types of evidence that converge to demonstrate that emotional experience indeed can be grounded in group membership and thus can operate at the group as well as the individual level. Specifically, we show that (a) categorization

determines emotional experience, (b) intergroup and individual emotions are quite different, (c) group members converge on the emotion they perceive the in-group to be experiencing, (d) categorization-based emotion is based on group-level appraisal, and (e) identification with a group moderates all of these effects.

Activation of Different Social Group Memberships Results in Different Emotional Experiences

Perhaps the most compelling kind of evidence for the power of social categorization to dictate emotional experience comes from studies that activate a number of different social identities within the same individuals. For example, we asked participants to think about themselves as a member of a particular group ("Think about yourself as an American") and to report, while doing so, the extent to which they experienced 12 distinct emotions (in general, not targeted at any specific object or event). We then asked them to think about themselves in terms of a different categorization ("Think about yourself as a woman") and again to describe the emotions they were experiencing. Regardless of the group memberships we activated, how we activated them, or the order in which they were activated, people reported significantly different and distinct emotional profiles depending on the social identity currently salient. Thus the same participant might report experiencing considerable pride, little anger, minimal fear, and considerable disgust when thinking about herself as a University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) student but less pride, much more anger, more fear, and minimal disgust as a Democrat, and so forth (Seger, Smith, & Mackie, 2009; E. R. Smith et al., 2007). For the same individual, merely activating different social categorizations resulted in different emotional experiences.

Other evidence shows that emotions directed toward specific groups and events are similarly determined by social categorization. For example, we asked U.S. college students to report the anger and respect they felt toward two different out-groups, the police and Muslims. Half of the participants were led to think about themselves as Americans (we told them we were comparing

American and non-American responses) and half as students (we told them we were comparing students' and nonstudents' responses). Participants felt more anger and less respect toward Muslims when categorized as Americans than when categorized as students. In contrast, participants felt less anger and more respect toward the police when categorized as Americans than when categorized as students (Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith 2008). The same out-group target thus elicited quite different emotions depending on the social categorization of the perceiver.

Yzerbyt and his colleagues also have demonstrated repeatedly that making salient one or another available group membership changes emotional reactions to events (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003; Gordijn et al., 2001; see Yzerbyt et al., 2006, for a review). In one study, for example, participants read about a proposal to raise tuition (and thus state revenues) for non-Coloradan students attending Colorado universities. When participants were thinking about themselves as students, they reacted with more anger to the proposal than when they were thinking about themselves as residents of the state (Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006).

Evidence now indicates that general emotional experience, emotions felt about particular out-groups and in-groups, and emotions about events all can be changed dramatically by the social categorization in terms of which individuals currently define themselves. These findings have been demonstrated using both between-individual and within-individual manipulations of a wide variety of categorizations. Across studies, the effects have been obtained by many different methods of activating categorizations, from directly asking people to think about the group membership or self-identify on a demographic checklist, to presenting more subtle cues making various in-groups or out-groups salient, such as playing background music or displaying photos closely associated with particular memberships (Seger, Smith, & Mackie, 2009). Thus, at the level of social identities, different identities dictate different emotional reactions.

Group-Based Emotional Experiences Differ From Individual Emotions

By definition, categorization-based emotions are conceptually and functionally distinct from

individual emotions because they are experienced as a function of group membership. In one of our earliest studies, we compared the emotional responses of women who imagined themselves facing a potentially physically threatening event either as unique individuals or as members of a group. The women expressed more fear when thinking about themselves as individuals than they did when thinking about themselves as UCSB students (Mackie et al., 2004). van Zomeren, Spears, and Leach (2008, Study 2) produced similar quantitative differences in emotion when they made either the individual- or group-level self salient by asking students to write about a typical day in their life either as an individual or as a student. When student identity was salient, participants reported greater anger in response to apparent unfair treatment of students at their university. Kuppens and Yzerbyt (reported in Yzerbyt & Kuppens, 2009) similarly showed that women reported different levels of emotions such as fear and disgust toward Muslims when categorized as women than when not.

We also have compared the general emotions experienced by the same individuals when they were thinking about themselves as unique individuals compared with thinking of themselves as members of different particular groups. In one study, people reported the individual emotions they were feeling and later reported how they were feeling after group memberships had been activated subtly by exposure, for example, to anthems associated with a university or photos of symbols or sights associated with national identity (Seger et al., 2009; see also Moons et al., 2009; E. R. Smith et al., 2007). Although such comparisons reveal moderate overlap between individual and group emotions, the profiles of emotions triggered by the mere contemplation of group membership are meaningfully distinct from individual emotion profiles. Individual and group profiles do not differ only in intensity of emotion (e.g., participants reported more pride, disgust, and fear as Americans than as individuals) but are qualitatively distinct. So, for example, an individual might report feeling a high level of happiness as an individual, mainly pride and fear as an American, or anger and contempt as a student.

Thus, people report feeling significantly different emotions as members of a group compared with the emotions they experience when they think about themselves as individuals, a finding that holds across general emotions and emotions toward specific events as well as a wide range of social categorizations. Of course, group-based and individual emotions need not be different in content, particularly because certain identities may be so strong that they come to dominate or crowd out any unique personal self. Perhaps extremely identified group members, or members of stigmatized groups whose group identity may be chronically salient, are never entirely free from the emotional consequences of social categorization.

The Profile of Categorization-Based Emotions Tends to Be Shared Among Members of a Given Group

When group membership is salient, people's attributes, attitudes, and behaviors tend to converge toward those that are prototypical of their groups. This is the classic evidence for self-categorization (S. A. Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997) because such convergence provides compelling evidence of the group nature of such phenomena. If self-categorization dictates emotional experience, the emotions that people report experiencing merely when thinking about themselves as members of a group also will reflect such convergence.

Several types of evidence provide support for this idea. First, categorized individuals report experiencing the emotions they believe to be typical of their group. In one study, Leonard, Moons, Mackie, and Smith (2011) asked women to complete an online survey that asked them to estimate how angry (among other emotions) they thought women (among other groups) were. Two to four weeks later the women came into the lab and, after reporting their gender (increasing the salience of this membership), reported how much anger they felt when thinking about themselves as women. Self-reported group-based anger was associated positively with perceptions of group anger. The angrier the women perceived their in-group to be in general, the angrier they reported feeling while thinking of themselves

as members of that group, a relation that was unchanged when perceptions of other groups' anger were entered as covariates. Thus when categorized as group members, people report feeling the way they think their group feels.

These results are supported by experimental demonstrations showing that categorized group members do converge toward the group emotional norm or prototype. In four different experiments (Moons et al., 2009), we gave participants information about particular emotions that particular groups were experiencing and then assessed the participants' emotions. Across all four experiments, participants adopted the group emotion norm upon categorization into the group. We found emotion convergence for positive (happiness) and negative (fear and anger) emotions and for national and gender groups, as well as for a laboratory-created minimal group. Convergence occurred for only the specific emotion relevant to the specific group membership activated and was not apparent in reported individual-level emotions. Thus, a salient social category membership produced convergence toward the perceived emotional experience of the in-group, exactly the outcome expected from self-categorization. Even more convincingly, these effects were amplified when we experimentally manipulated group-belonging motivation by leading members to believe that they were somewhat different from the rest of their group (see also Reyson & Branscombe, 2008). Thus, emotional experiences clearly are rooted in social categorization.

Further evidence for such an effect comes from multiple studies in which we assessed the extent to which categorized individuals' emotions shift toward their in-group emotion norm. In these studies, participants reported the emotions they felt after being categorized into one of several groups. We then used the mean level of emotion expressed by others categorized in the same way as an estimate of the group's emotion norm (or typical pattern of emotions), permitting us to examine the similarity of each participant's reported group emotion to that group-typical pattern. Regardless of emotion or group, or whether participants were explicitly or subtly categorized, participants' group-level emotion was associated independently and significantly with

the average level of this emotion felt by other in-group members over and above the variance explained by each participant's individual emotions (Banerji et al., 2011; Seger et al., 2009; E. R. Smith et al., 2007). This finding suggests that group-level emotions are influenced by the norm for the group-level emotion in the in-group. Moreover, the reported profile of group-level emotions is specific to the particular group (Moons et al., 2009; Seger et al., 2009). Convergence was not merely the product of "thinking like a(ny) group member" but specifically of "thinking of oneself as a member of this particular group." Thus, social categorization produces considerable convergence in emotional experience, just as it produces convergence in self-perception, adherence to behavioral norms, and so forth (Turner et al., 1987). Intergroup emotions are shared socially (Parkinson et al., 2005).

Categorization-Based Emotions Are Based on Intergroup Rather Than Individual Appraisals

Although some categorization-based emotions might be activated spontaneously merely by self-stereotyping, what we have termed as acute intergroup or group-based emotional reactions to objects and events more often are determined by real-time appraisal (interpretation or construal), as foreshadowed in E. R. Smith's (1993) formulation. What makes it clear that such emotions are a group-level phenomenon, however, is that they are based not on appraisals of consequences for the self but rather on appraisals made in relation to the in-group. Self-categorization leads individuals to view the world (including the in-group and out-groups and their members) in terms of consequences for the in-group, so that they evaluate outcomes or events in terms of what is good or bad for the in-group. For example, an observer thinking about herself as a female might positively appraise another woman's promotion and feel pride, even if as an individual the promotion of a similar other over the self is cause for negative appraisals and envy (Brewer & Weber, 1994).

Perhaps the most compelling indirect evidence for group-based appraisals is that categorization-based emotions are experienced on behalf of the in-group even when events are not personally involving. Thus, they occur in situations in which, by definition, any appraisal base for individual emotions is not present. In several well-known studies, individual group members have been shown to feel happy or sad depending on the success or failure of a group, such as a sports team, with which they identify, even though, of course, they did not personally contribute to that outcome (Cialdini et al., 1976; Crisp, Heuston, Farr, & Turner, 2007). Members of groups who have not personally transgressed nevertheless feel guilt at the misdeeds of other group members (Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004; Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2007; Swim & Miller, 1999). Gordijn et al. (2001) showed that participants were angrier and less happy when they categorized with a group victimized by an event than when they did not, even though they were not affected individually. Mackie et al. (2004) reported that UCSB women reported feeling fear on behalf of their fellow group members, even when they were not involved personally. Finally, retribution for transgressions against group members other than the self often is inflicted on out-group members other than the perpetrators (for a review, see Vasquez, Lickel, & Hennigan, 2010). In each of these cases, emotions and behavioral reactions occurred because of events that affected other members of a membership group, not the person individually. By inference then, these events must have been appraised in a group-relevant way.

There are also a few direct demonstrations of categorization-determined appraisals. H. J. Smith and Spears (1996) found that when individual identity was primed, participants' evaluations of a situation reflected their personal concerns, whereas the activation of group identity led to evaluations that reflected both group and personal concerns (see also Kawakami & Dion, 1993; H. J. Smith, Spears, & Oyen, 1994). Kuppens and Yzerbyt (2008) reported that participants categorized as women judged situations of physical danger and potential loss of personal rights as more threatening than did participants in an individual control condition. We also have shown that activation of a social identity makes current members of a group carefully process information that will affect only future members of

the group, even though such messages, being personally irrelevant, are virtually ignored when social categorization is not activated (Maitner, Mackie, Claypool, & Crisp, 2010). Other work has provided evidence for changes in appraisal driven by the salience of different group memberships. When categorized as students, participants appraised a proposal to raise tuition at the University of Colorado for nonresidents of the state as more unjust than when categorized as Colorado residents (Gordijn et al., 2006). Similarly, Garcia-Prieto, Mackie, Tran, and Smith (2007) asked Hispanic and White participants to review the application materials of an ethnic minority group member hired either through merit or a diversity recruitment procedure. Whites appraised the hiring of a minority for diversity reasons as more harmful to the in-group and beneficial to the out-group, whereas Hispanics appraised the diversity hiring as more beneficial. Finally, Kessler et al. (2010) demonstrated that both the positive emotions and resentment generated by out-groups is determined by the appraisal of relative prototypicality of the out-group compared with the in-group. As they have pointed out, group prototypicality is a purely intergroup appraisal in which individual concerns are absent. Thus, the emotions they studied were generated at least in part by a purely intergroup-level appraisal.

The Impact of Categorization on Emotion Is Moderated by Identification

Thinking of oneself as a group member is a necessary condition for intergroup emotions, but it may not always be sufficient. Although everyone belongs to groups, there are some group members for whom self-categorization into particular groups either occurs more fully (the group categorization is more central to the self) or assumes greater social and emotional significance (the group membership is more affectively laden or important to their positive view of the self; Iyer & Leach, 2009; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008; see also Chapter 8, this volume). Thus, individuals differ in their identification with any particular in-group.

Identification moderates many of the consequences of social categorization (for a review, see Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). If intergroup

emotions are a group-level consequence of group membership, degree of in-group identification also should moderate the impact of categorization on emotional experience. That is, just as high identifiers are more likely to see themselves as having group-definitional features than are low identifiers, highly identified members of the group should be more likely to engage in intergroup appraisal and experience the emotions that result from them more than those for whom identity is not so thorough going.

Two different kinds of evidence provide support for this idea. First, identification consistently moderates the extent to which group members share their in-group's emotion. When group members learn what emotions their in-group is experiencing, it is the highly identified members who most dramatically match their own emotions to that standard. When this leads the highly identified members to feel more anger, they also show more risky decision making, a well-established downstream consequence of anger (Moons et al., 2009). The extent to which any individual's group-level emotion resembles the group-typical level of this emotion is moderated similarly by identification, with the effect being much stronger among those who highly identify than those who do not (E. R. Smith et al., 2007). This effect occurs across a wide range of groups (Seger, Smith, Kinias, & Mackie, 2009) and even when categorization occurs spontaneously and emotions are reported without explicit reference to group membership (Seger et al., 2009). Banerji et al. (2011) recently replicated the moderating effect of identification on convergence in different kinds of groups: social category, close knit, and work related. For all of these group types, those who reported the group as more important to them also converged more closely on the in-group average for any given emotion. Importantly, these data also reveal that identification does not moderate the convergence of emotions that people experience when part of a loose association, whose emotion is often more context driven (e.g., waiting in line at the bank) than based on psychological ties. In sum, the more highly members identify with a group, the more they appear to share the group's emotion.

A second type of evidence for the importance of identification examines relations between level of

identification and the intensity with which inter-group emotions are experienced. In our early theorizing about intergroup emotion, we hypothesized that those invested most thoroughly in the group would feel group-based emotion more easily or frequently (consistent with the idea that identification constitutes readiness to self-categorize in a particular way) or more strongly (consistent with the idea of high identifiers making more group-based appraisals). This relation is well supported empirically when it comes to positive emotions. In E. R. Smith et al. (2007), for example, we merely asked people to consider themselves in terms of a particular group membership and to report the emotions they were feeling, sometimes in general and sometimes with the in-group or the out-group specified as the target. We consistently found that identification was correlated significantly and positively with positive group emotions, such as joy and pride, a finding since replicated across different types of groups (Banerji et al., 2011). Thus, participants who report high levels of identification with a particular group also report feeling high levels of the positive emotions associated with that group identity. This relation also holds for positive group-based emotions directed specifically at a target. For example, highly identified group members experience more satisfaction in response to the in-group's acts of aggression (Maitner et al., 2007) and feel more pleasure at the downfall of a rival out-group (Combs, Powell, Schurtz, & Smith, 2009).

Although it is negatively valenced, out-group-directed anger also is felt more intensely by highly identified members of a group. E. R. Smith et al. (2007) found strong positive relations between identification and out-group-directed anger, replicating the event- and object-specific out-group anger reported by several studies (e.g., Gordijn et al., 2006; Kessler & Hollbach, 2005; Mackie et al., 2000, 2004; Musgrove & McGarty, 2008; Rydell et al., 2008; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). Impressively, Pennekamp, Doosje, Zebel, and Fischer (2007) were able to demonstrate that in Surinamese immigrants to the Netherlands, Surinamese identification was related positively to group-based anger about slavery, whereas Dutch identity was related negatively to such anger. These relations fit well with the idea that those

invested in the group feel the emotions associated with that group most strongly, but they are also consistent with the idea that those heavily invested in the group more readily adopt or endorse emotions (especially anger at the out-group) that reflect on the in-group as positive or powerful.

These possibilities may be disentangled partially by examining the relations between identification and other negative emotions. Group-based guilt has been the most studied. When group membership is activated, the general guilt that people report is related negatively but only weakly to identification (E. R. Smith et al., 2007), but there is a stronger and more reliable negative relation between guilt about specific in-group transgressions and identification (Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006; Mallett, Huntsinger, Sinclair, & Swim, 2008). Moreover, the ability of high identifiers to eschew group guilt is rooted in their group-based appraisals; high identifiers do not feel guilt because they do not make guilt-producing appraisals about in-group transgressions. Compared with low identifiers, high identifiers appraise in-group transgressions as more positive (by interpreting them in a broader context; Pennekamp et al., 2007) and as more justified (Maitner et al., 2007), both of which lower feelings of guilt. If the deed is not so bad, and if the in-group was not to blame for it anyway, there is no need to feel guilty. Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan (2006) provided consistent evidence, showing that the more loyalty to the group Israeli Jews reported, the more likely they were to exonerate the group from blame for transgressions, which in turn reduced guilt.

Such findings demonstrate the important role that identification plays in the group-level appraisal process that underlies group-based emotions, but they also suggest the complexity of the effects of identification under varying circumstances and for different emotions. In our thinking about identification, we assumed that for some individuals the self-categorization and depersonalization process might occur more fully (the group categorization is more central to the self) or might assume greater social and emotional significance (the group membership is more affectively laden or important to a positive view of the self). These various aspects of identification increasingly are captured in different subscales

of identification scales (Leach et al., 2008), although they are confounded in some standard measures of group identification (Jackson & Smith, 1999). Mackie et al. (2009) proposed that self overlap–centrality aspects of identification and affective–importance aspects of identification might play different roles in the generation of intergroup appraisals and thus of emotions because of their impact on appraisal. One possibility is that overlap–centrality has an impact on the extent to which appraisals are group based. In one study, we found that high-identifying Whites were more likely both to appraise a diversity hiring procedure as more harmful to the in-group and to feel more anger than less identified group members; thus, their appraisals were more quantitatively extreme (Garcia-Prieto et al., 2007). In comparison, affective–importance aspects of identification may combine with situational factors to bias the qualitative nature of appraisals (e.g., by justifying in-group transgressions) and thus what emotion is experienced. This mechanism reflects Doosje et al.'s (1998) argument that those who are highly identified also are invested in what emotions their in-group elicits. When emotions reflect appraisals of the group as positive or potent relative to other groups, high identifiers might be particularly likely to construe the world in this way and thus to feel such emotions more strongly. On the other hand, group members who identify strongly will avoid emotions that imply a criticism of the in-group if the context allows it, and thus they will be motivated to make appraisals incompatible with such emotions.

Such a view helps explain our findings that anger directed at the in-group generally is related negatively to identification—high identifiers typically do not see, or do not wish to see, their group as having acted in a way that elicits anger. When circumstances demand, however, the in-group can be a target of anger. In one study, group members who were insulted and who perceived the in-group as not responding appropriately reported considerable in-group-directed anger that was dissipated only if the group acted (Maitner et al., 2007). Because we did not collect identification data in that study, however, we cannot tell whether high identification made anger at the group more or less intense. Given Doosje's perspective, it is just as plausible that high

identifiers feel more irritation at the in-group if its behavior undermines its image as positive and powerful as it is that those low in identification feel free to feel such anger (see also Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004).

In sum, there is an impressive accumulation of evidence from multiple research endeavors for the group-level nature of the emotions triggered by self-categorization and identification. Changing identity changes emotional experience. Categorization-based emotions are meaningfully distinct from the same person's individual emotions, socially shared among members of the same group, based on appraisals of group rather than individual concerns, and meaningfully related to the group member's degree of group identification.

CATEGORIZATION-BASED EMOTION AS A REGULATOR OF INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR

What are the consequences of experiencing group-based emotions? In developing intergroup emotions theory, we were particularly mindful of the functionality of emotion, the role that emotion plays in helping humans act to meet their basic needs and fulfill their goals, immediate or long term. Just as individual emotion regulates personal relations and interactions, so too, we have argued, does intergroup emotion regulate intergroup relations and intergroup interactions. Research bears out our claim: Meta-analyses have shown group-based emotions toward objects and events to be better predictors of collective action than perceptions of the objects and events (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Focusing on group-level emotions as regulating the relations and interactions between and among groups has advanced our theoretical understanding of intergroup relations in three major ways.

The Intergroup Emotions Approach Allows a More Nuanced Conception of Intergroup Biases Than Does the Standard View of Prejudice as a Negative Evaluation

Adopting an emotion-specific, rather than a valence-based, approach allows for differentiated and nuanced, rather than only positive and negative,

evaluative reactions to in-groups and out-groups. Whether emotions are assumed to arise from specific sets of appraisals or considerations of other information in the context (Mackie et al., 2009), bringing emotion theories to bear on thinking about prejudice makes it possible to consider a range of reactions to groups that is at once both much broader and more specific than thinking about the group as merely liked or disliked. Depending on how an out-group or its actions are appraised, the group can be hated, scorned, feared, admired, or envied—or any number of other possibilities. In fact, extending the range of possible reactions to out-groups is acknowledged as one of the key contributions of IET to the understanding of prejudice (Spears et al., 2011; Yzerbyt & Kuppens, 2009). It is now well established that group members feel a range of different distinct emotions about other groups. Although these emotions feed into general evaluations of (prejudice toward) these groups, prejudice based on anger, disgust, or fear, for example, can involve quite different subjective feelings (Brewer & Alexander, 2002; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Tapias, Glaser, Keltner, Vasquez, & Wickens, 2007).

IET not only draws distinctions among forms of prejudice based on different emotions but also allows for the possibility of positively evaluated groups eliciting negative emotions, as when "model minorities" attract envy (Fiske et al., 2002; E. R. Smith & Ho, 2002). Group-level emotion approaches thus provide an explanation for a full range of negative reactions to out-groups, in contrast to social identity theory, which appears to better explain in-group preference than out-group derogation (Brewer, 1999).

There is still some ambiguity in the literature regarding whether prejudice should be redefined in terms of these emotional reactions ("a variety of different emotional prejudices," Spears et al., 2011), or whether it is more appropriate to retain the classic definition of prejudice as a summary evaluation that can be based on different emotions. What is certainly true is that two groups can be evaluated equally for different emotional reasons. Ray, Mackie, Smith, and Terman (2012), for example, categorized participants by asking them first to indicate whether they were Democrats or Republicans and whether they belonged to Greek organizations (sororities or fraternities) on campus. Only responses from non-Greek Democrats could be analyzed because too few participants represented the other combinations. The participants then supplied general thermometer evaluative ratings and reported the admiration and disgust (among other emotions) they felt for non-Greek Democrats (a double in-group), non-Greek Republicans and Greek Democrats (two partial in-groups), or Greek Republicans (a double out-group). General evaluation ratings were related to the admiration and disgust the targets triggered but in different measure depending on the target being evaluated. Moreover, groups evaluated similarly earned these similar prejudice ratings quite differently. Greek Democrats and non-Greek Republicans were evaluated equally negatively but for very different reasons: The former elicited neither admiration nor disgust whereas the latter elicited both, with one emotion apparently canceling the other out in evaluations. Thus, the general evaluative ratings that make up typical prejudice measures provide less specific information than group-based emotion measures.

Focusing on Distinct Group-Level Emotions Allows Differentiated Predictions About Discrimination

Intergroup emotion is readiness—the impulse, desire, tendency, or intention—for intergroup action, and specific group-based emotions (in comparison to general positive or negative evaluations) produce readiness for specific intergroup actions (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). That is, all else being equal, group-based anger involves the impulse, desire, tendency, or intention to take action against the source of the anger; group-based pride increases the impulse, desire, tendency, or intention to affiliate or approach the target of the pride; and so forth (for summaries, see Iyer & Leach, 2008; Mackie et al., 2009; Parkinson et al., 2005). Attention to specific distinct emotions puts the emphasis on what groups do to one another (rather than what they think of one another) and on specific forms of discrimination such as harm versus avoidance (rather than generalized bias).

Importantly, it is people's group-based, not their individual, emotions that dictate readiness to act in response to both the in-group and various out-groups (Seger et al., 2009; E. R. Smith et al., 2007), and group members' desire for particular actions is influenced by both their general and event-specific group-based emotion (Gordijn et al., 2006; Mackie et al., 2000; Maitner et al., 2006, 2007). This readiness presumably explains the privileged relation that group-based emotions have with actual intergroup behavior. Increased fear felt by potential group victims of terrorist acts predicts actual anxiety-reducing information seeking (Dumont et al., 2003) and a recent meta-analysis confirms that behavioral intentions predict actual behavior in the collective action domain (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).

Group-Level Emotions Regulate Group-Level Behavior Dynamically Over Time

Intergroup emotions do not just motivate behavior but also modulate the relations and interactions between and among groups by up- and down-regulating particular behaviors in response to changing intergroup dynamics. A particular situation may induce a distinct emotion, which in turn triggers a distinct behavior. But implementing that behavior may well dissipate that precipitating emotion or even trigger a new emotion as the action itself generates new appraisals and so forth. Maitner et al. (2006) provided evidence of this regulatory function by showing the emotional consequences of satisfying or thwarting intergroup behavioral intentions. In two experiments, intergroup anger dissipated (and was replaced by satisfaction) when the in-group confronted or attacked the out-group source of anger. If fear was present, however, attacking the out-group increased rather than decreased it. And if the in-group failed to act in response to a threat, anger directed at the in-group was generated, as if to motivate the in-group to engage in appropriate behavior. In a third study, group-based guilt following aggression declined when the in-group made reparations but increased if the in-group aggressed again. Thus, whether or not the desired "goal" of the emotions was achieved (the motivated behavior) either increased or decreased the motivating state (the group-based emotion), presumably because of

changes in appraisals of relevant group concerns as behavior unfolds.

In support of their assumed regulatory function, categorization-based emotions have been shown to be implicated in derogation, discrimination, confrontation, and violence against out-groups as well as in prejudice reduction, protest against injustice, and intergroup reconciliation processes. The following section reviews some of the evidence showing intergroup emotion's contribution to negative intergroup relations and then discusses the research that has been triggered by recognition of, and attempts to manage, the role that group-based emotions play in positive intergroup relations.

ROLE OF CATEGORIZATION-BASED EMOTIONS IN INTERGROUP CONFLICT

We already have cited empirical examples of the role played in prejudice by group-based emotions such as anger, disgust, envy, and fear. Additionally, there has been intense interest in the emotional precursors of intergroup aggression, broadly defined. One of the promised benefits of the group-based emotions approach is to predict and explain the more extreme, virulent, and violent forms of prejudice and discrimination that do not seem easily explained by more cognitive approaches.

Out-Group-Directed Intergroup Anger

As noted, out-group-directed anger is a particularly potent predictor of antagonistic and aggressive behavior. For example, anger at an out-group predicts desire for both verbal and physical out-group confrontation (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Mackie et al., 2000; E. R. Smith et al., 2007). Women feeling anger are more likely to interpret intergroup interactions as discriminatory and to endorse confrontational collective action (Leonard, Moons, et al., 2011), especially if they are encouraged to express rather than suppress their anger (Gill & Matheson, 2006). Similarly, out-group-directed anger predicts willingness to engage in actual confrontation with the out-group (Gordijn et al., 2006; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2007; H. J. Smith, Cronin, & Kessler, 2008). A recent review indicated that the strongest support for military

action after the September 11 attacks came from Americans who felt anger at the terrorists (Huddy & Feldman, 2011; see also Cheung-Blunden & Blunden, 2008; Sadler, Lineberger, Correll, & Park, 2005; Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, & Morgan, 2006). In addition, analyses of conflict in Bosnia and Serbia showed that anger predicted support for economic sanctions and reductions in civil rights as well as overt military action against the out-group (Spanovic, Lickel, Denson, & Petrovic, 2010).

One reason that group-based anger facilitates aggression is that its cognitive consequences tend to promote aggressive behavior. Group members feeling anger on behalf of their group experience arousal, show reduced systematic processing, and (as opposed to those feeling intergroup fear) show increased risk taking (Moons et al., 2009; Rydell et al., 2008).

Such findings have motivated scrutiny of the appraisal roots of group-based anger. As can be expected, appraisals of severity of harm or threat to the in-group play a dominant role in triggering anger (Gordijn et al., 2006; Mackie et al., 2000; van Zomeren et al., 2004) and are exacerbated if the out-group refuses to rectify or apologize for past aggression, adding insult to injury (Leonard, Mackie, & Smith, 2011; Maitner et al., 2006). Furthermore, appraisals of relative strength appear to play a role in producing anger, with strong in-groups and weak out-groups typically engendering more anger and aggression (Huddy & Feldman, 2011; Mackie et al., 2000; Otten, 2009) and appraisals of weak in-groups and strong out-groups typically engendering more fear and avoidance (Dumont et al., 2003). Nevertheless, even a weak in-group (or at least its highly identified members) can be moved to anger and confrontation when access to vital symbolic resources is blocked (although avoidance is preferred if the threat is physical; Otten, 2009). This response indicates that relative strength need not be considered only in terms of physical resources. As Spears et al. (2011) pointed out, small terrorist out-groups that might be weak in access to physical or material resources nevertheless can be judged strong in terms of commitment to ideology and willingness to engage in desperate acts, weakening the in-group's ability to cope with threat and sustain conflict.

The fact that even objectively weak groups can experience group-based anger also points to the importance of appraisals of injustice, or being unfairly wronged, in producing anger. van Zomeren et al. (2004) found increased group-based anger and intention to engage in collective action against the school authorities when students not only were faced with a threat of raised tuition but also had not been consulted about the increase, a clear breach of procedural justice. In fact, van Zomeren and colleagues (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004; see also Chapter 19, this volume) have proposed that appraisals of strength and appraisals of injustice contribute differently to confrontational behavior in the face of threat. These authors' dual-path model suggests one route by which appraisals such as injustice (and presumably severity of harm) feed into group-based anger and action, supplemented by a second route in which appraisals of group strength or efficacy separately promote collective action.

Other Group-Based Emotions Implicated in Aggression

Although the fact that anger promotes out-group confrontation is undisputed, more recent research has focused on whether specific combinations of anger and other group-based emotions might make out-group aggression even more likely. One approach has been to focus on the role of fear in promoting aggression, despite the assumed relationship between fear and avoidance—the flight part of fight or flight. First, in a line of research focused on prejudice toward the homeless, van Zomeren, Fischer, and Spears (2007) showed that fear or anxiety could amplify the effects of anger. Participants who feared or did not fear the homeless were asked to imagine that a homeless person either sang and asked for money or demanded money in an intimidating way. The imagined intimidating encounter produced high anger in everyone, but fearful participants also showed anger even when the homeless person was not intimidating. In a second study, offensive action tendencies also revealed independent effects of threat and fear, with those feeling high fear and high threat proving most confrontational. Second, Spanovic et al. (2010) investigated

fear and anger as motivators of intergroup aggression in the context of conflict in Serbia and in Bosnia. Although fear was correlated negatively with desire for aggression in the Bosnian conflict, increased fear of the out-group was related to a desire for increased aggression in the ongoing conflict in Serbia. Like van Zomeren and colleagues, Spanovic and colleagues argued that fear—in this case, aroused by uncertainty of the outcome in an ongoing severe conflict—combined with threat to powerfully motivate intergroup aggression. In more recent work, they showed that if group members focus on the future, intergroup fear motivates aggression; however, if group members focus on the past, intergroup anger is the best predictor of aggression. All of these findings suggest that intergroup anger, whether alone or in combination with other specific intergroup emotions, is especially likely to promote aggression and other negative outcomes.

The role of both group-based anger and fear in predicting political intolerance (violation of civil liberties and denial of rights to expression and political representation) has been compared with that of another group-based emotion, hatred, in a series of studies focused on intergroup relations in Israel (Halperin, 2008; Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009). Out-group-directed hatred is differentiated from anger in terms of both extremity and its appraisal of the out-group as stably and inherently evil and as posing an enduring and intractable severe threat to the in-group. The behavioral consequence of hatred in this view is not confrontation or aggression aimed at changing or correcting a situation (as some have argued is true of anger; e.g., Fischer & Roseman, 2007), but rather it is harm to or annihilation of the other (Halperin, 2008). In four large-scale surveys conducted in Israel, Halperin et al. (2009) assessed the relations between group-based anger, fear, hatred, and political intolerance. Results showed that group-based hatred predicted intolerance better than anger and fear (the impact of which tended to be mediated by hatred), and that this relation was strongest in conditions of threat to the in-group and among politically unsophisticated individuals. Although these studies focused on participants' willingness to exclude groups, such as "extreme leftists," "seculars," "ultra-orthodox," and "extreme rightists," about 37% of the respondents chose "Arabs" as the target of their group-based anger, fear, and hatred. Given that its appraisal basis appears to be the judgment of irrevocable evil and its behavioral consequence is exclusion or removal of the target group, more extended study of group-based hatred, and particularly its relation to anger, is imperative.

Another group-based emotion implicated in more severe intergroup aggression is disgust, particularly in combination with anger. Both anger and disgust toward an out-group predict desire to attack that group (Mackie et al., 2000). Both share an appraisal base of the possibility of harm to the in-group, but the harm that elicits disgust is infiltration of dangerous foods, germs, or bodily products and, in its more elaborated forms, infiltration of dangerous ideas, attitudes, or behaviors, usually regarded as moral violations (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008; see also Chapter 5, this volume). In analyses of student protests in Germany in 2007, Tausch et al. (2011) showed that anger predicted support for "normative" forms of confrontation, such as protest and petition signing, but that disgust for the out-group appeared to justify more extreme and aggressive intergroup behavior, such as arson and violent attacks (see also Schütte & Kessler, 2007; Spears, Scheepers, & van Zomeren, 2009, cited in Spears et al., 2011).

Although these studies focused on in-group actions taken against a powerful out-group, there is a clear connection to the wider literature on the role of disgust in moral exclusion and its subsequent facilitation of aggression (Martín-Peña & Opotow, 2011; Opotow, 2005; Staub, 1989; see also Chapter 5, this volume). In fact, perhaps moral outrage can be thought of as that combination of anger and disgust that arises in reaction to what is perceived as a moral transgression (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Although some have argued that moral outrage is directed at third parties or larger societal structures rather than in-groups or out-groups (Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002; Montada & Schneider, 1989), we believe that moral outrage can be seen as a group-based emotion directed at any of the usual targets for such

emotions, producing associated action tendencies toward those targets. Experiencing moral outrage at an out-group may place that group "beyond the moral pale," making it so different from the in-group as to suspend the usual protections accorded to in-group members (N. Haslam, 2006; Opotow, 2005). Evidence already shows that disgust or contempt at the group level can play a role in the dehumanization and moral exclusion that are precursors to more egregious forms of intergroup aggression, such as ethnic cleaning and genocide (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Harris & Fiske, 2006; see also Chapter 11, this volume). Although the most effective emotion for mobilizing action may differ with the situation (Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009), the combination of anger and disgust in outrage appears to be a particularly effective one.

The recognition that categorization-based emotions likely contribute to the more contentious of intergroup interactions has shed new light on some of the longest standing issues of concern to social psychologists. Two lines of research focused on group-based anger appear to be particularly generative. The first has focused on the appraisal antecedents of anger and particularly on the role of injustice and illegitimacy in the likelihood that anger will be elicited to motivate aggression. The second area of promising research is dedicated to understanding the consequences of combinations of anger and other emotions that precede, accompany, and follow the distancing of others, not just into out-group social categories but perhaps even by dehumanizing and morally excluding them.

ROLE OF CATEGORIZATION-BASED EMOTIONS IN INTERGROUP RECONCILIATION

Perhaps because of the insights they provide about intergroup prejudice and conflict, categorization-based emotion approaches have proven remarkably generative in suggesting means for prejudice reduction and intergroup reconciliation. These developments have been facilitated by increased attention to the distinct roles of various positive emotions, particularly respect or admiration.

Group-Based Emotions and Prejudice Reduction

Among the first to recognize the benevolent effects of positive intergroup emotions, Pettigrew and his colleagues (Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; see also Chapter 20, this volume) found that increased positive friendship-related emotions, as well as decreased anxiety toward the out-group, were correlated with prejudice reductions driven by intergroup contact. Building on this idea, Miller, Smith, and Mackie (2004) showed that the impact of contact between White college students and African Americans on reduced prejudice was mediated by positive as well as negative emotions that the White students felt toward African Americans. To further elucidate the role of particular emotions, Seger, Park, Banerji, Smith, and Mackie (2011) examined six distinct intergroup emotions (admiring and respectful, angry and resentful, fearful and anxious, disgusted and sickened, jealous and envious, pitying and sympathetic) felt by members of one group about members of another as mediators of the contact–prejudice relationship using representative samples of U.S. White, Black, and Asian American respondents. Intergroup admiration or respect and anger or resentment were significant mediators of the impact of contact on attitudes for all pairs of perceiver and target ethnic groups. A second study examined a different type of out-group, gay men, and replicated the importance of admiration for this group. Disgust (rather than anger as in the case of the ethnic groups) was the other reliable mediator in this study, consistent with the idea that gay men, as compared with ethnic out-groups, are perceived as posing a different type of threat (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).

These findings are important because they demonstrate the role of group-based emotion in mediating the effects of contact, yet they also speak to the complex issues of categorization and generalization that still are unresolved in the contact literature. Two main points require further research clarification. First, it is not clear whether all of the emotions commonly referred to in the contact literature are categorization-based emotions as we have defined them in this chapter. It is well established that reducing what commonly is called

intergroup anxiety through contact reduces prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). But such anxiety is a group-based emotion only if it is based in categorization as a group member and appraisal of group concerns. If a White believes that Latinos might be taking resources from Whites, she might experience intergroup fear or anxiety toward Latinos. If that intergroup anxiety is assuaged during her interaction with a Latina, intergroup emotion is at play. If a White person fears that his or her reactions as a White will make White people in general seem clumsy or prejudiced or insensitive during interactions with Latinos, and then finds during interaction that this is not the case, intergroup emotion is at play. But if a White fears violating some *personal* goal of tolerance during interactions with a member of another group, or worries that the other individual will be hostile to the self, these emotions (which also might be reduced by contact) are individual rather than group based. Many studies of contact rely directly on Stephan and Stephan's (1985) conception of intergroup anxiety, which is assessed by explicitly asking about anticipated negative consequences *for the self* in intergroup encounters. Reducing such individual-level emotions may reduce prejudice but not because of group-level mechanisms. Note, for example, that when they specifically measured group-level emotions, Seger et al. (2011) found anger, but not fear, to be a mediator of contact's prejudice-reducing benefit.

Similar issues arise with another positive affective mediator of contact effects: empathy (Harwood, Hewstone, Paolini, & Voci, 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Tarrant, Dazeley, & Cottom, 2009). First, because most studies in this area have not explicitly manipulated whether or not respondents to empathy questions are categorized, and indeed often treat empathy as an individual difference variable, it often is not clear whether individual or group-based processes are at work. Second, empathy can be interpersonal rather than group based, and these variants of empathy may have different effects. For example, manipulations of empathy for particular individuals prompt different behavioral strategies than manipulations of group-based similarity (Batson et al., 1999; Kramer & Brewer, 1984).

Third, many authors cite Davis's (1994) conception of the affective aspect of empathy as affective reactions to the experience of others. From the categorization-based emotion point of view, the key question is whether those reactions *to* the experiences of others entail feeling *for* others or *as* others. Many of the items used in studies of affective empathy are ambiguous on this point. If a member of another group feels sad and you say you would feel sad as a result, it is unclear whether you are feeling like them or for them. If self-categorization allows people to feel the same emotions *as* the members of another group feel, empathy would be group based. For example, when an out-group is attacked, the in-group might feel angry toward the attackers. On the other hand, if the in-group feels sorry for the attacked out-group, it constitutes group-based pity rather than empathy. In this regard, at least one of the items used in a recent analysis of contact and empathy (Swart, Hewstone, Christ, & Voci, 2011) seems to assess group-based empathy: Respondents were considered empathetic if they felt angry when they saw a member of another group treated unfairly. If this kind of item mediates the impact of contact on prejudice reduction, then group-based empathy could be said to reduce prejudice.

There is clearly evidence both that the arousal of positive group-based emotions, such as admiration and warmth, during contact can reduce prejudice and that the reduction of negative group-based emotions, such as anger and perhaps anxiety, during contact also can reduce prejudice. However, because emotions can be both individual and group based, not all affective mediators of contact are necessarily group based.

Whether interpersonal and intergroup processes are at play is also relevant to the second issue: Do positive or negative emotions elicited by the actual target with whom there is contact generalize to the out-group as a whole? Although decategorization or individualizing processes seem likely to lessen prejudiced reactions toward a single individual, generalization to every other member of the group seems less likely under these conditions. Decategorization processes also deprive group members of perhaps a crucial source of identity (for discussion, see Brown & Hewstone, 2005). These considerations have led

proponents of social identity approaches to argue that group membership or category salience must be preserved throughout prejudice reduction interventions, such as contact or activation of a common superordinate group membership (Brown & Hewstone, 2005).

A variety of findings are consistent with the idea that group-based emotions mediate other prejudice-reduction effects. Burns, Isbell, and Tyler (2008) showed that suppression of (negative) emotions can increase desire for interaction. They instructed highly prejudiced participants to suppress their emotions while watching videos of gay couples. Compared with an emotion-expression condition, these participants later indicated greater willingness for contact with gays, an effect mediated by the positive emotions they experienced while trying to suppress their (typically negative) emotional reactions.

We also have demonstrated that intergroup emotions can explain the prejudice-reducing effects of cross-categorization (Ray et al., 2012). Cross-categorization (in which people are reminded of group memberships that cut across a salient in-group–out-group distinction) commonly is seen as reducing prejudice because it makes shared in-group memberships salient. In three studies using both naturally occurring and novel groups, however, we found that prejudice toward various combinations of partial in-groups (compared with double in-groups and double out-groups) depended on the group-based emotions those combinations elicited. Those discrete group-based emotions both accounted for the effects of cross-categorization on evaluative measures of prejudice and revealed distinct emotional paths to prejudice reduction that were obscured by the evaluative measures alone. These studies also revealed that particular group-based emotions better predicted prejudice than the mere fact of whether the cross-categorizations were shared in groups or not, as some partial in-groups provoked more negative emotion than the relevant double out-groups. For example, among White egalitarians, White racists (a partial in-group) might evoke more anger than Black racists (a double out-group). Researchers should elucidate the role that discrete group-based emotions might play in other prejudice-reduction techniques, such as making salient shared superordinate group memberships.

Group-Based Emotion Precursors of Restitution, Repair, and Reconciliation

Research on group-based emotions, and particularly the consequences of group-based guilt, has inspired researchers to move beyond prejudice reduction to focus on what might prompt one group to try to right wrongs and repair injustices visited upon an out-group. The study of group-based guilt is noteworthy because it makes clear that intergroup emotions can be directed at in-groups, not only at out-groups. The original focus of this work was on guilt resulting from an in-group's historically exploitative actions, and thus what might motivate group members to redress the consequences of their own group's bad behavior. Group-based guilt is associated with greater desire for a wide range of harm-reducing actions: apology, reparations, policies reversing poor treatment, or suppression of further aggression (Berndsen & McGarthy, 2010; Branscombe et al., 2002; Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer & Leach, 2010; Iyer et al., 2003; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; Maitner et al., 2007; McGarty et al., 2005; Schmitt, Behner, Montada, Muller, & Muller-Fohrbrodt, 2000; Swim & Miller, 1999; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). In-group-directed pride and satisfaction, in contrast, both decrease intentions to redress poor behavior on the in-group's part (Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008; Maitner et al., 2007).

The focus of this research was broadened by Leach et al.'s (2006) report that although guilt explained attitudinal support for reparations, only in-group-directed anger explained willingness to actually take political action to bring about reparations. Building on this idea that distinct emotions were quite specifically tied to behavioral consequences, Iyer et al. (2007) assessed the group-based guilt, shame (another emotion evoked by negative in-group behavior, Otten, 2009), and anger experienced by American and British students in the context of the war in Iraq and what political action these various emotions motivated. It was again anger that was associated with the desire to compensate Iraq and confront those responsible as well as to withdraw from Iraq. These results converge with findings reported by Spears et al. (2011) that in-group-directed anger moved members of advantaged groups to act on behalf of disadvantaged groups,

particularly when the in-group is the perpetrator of actions seen as illegitimate. Thus, both in-group-directed guilt and in-group-directed anger have been found to elicit behaviors that help restore equality or right injustice, with anger again being found to be a more "active" emotion in this regard.

It is easy to link these findings to the role of out-group-directed anger in prompting confrontation and thus promoting intergroup conflict with a group thought to be harming the in-group discussed earlier. A similar link has been made to moral outrage as a motivator of action on behalf of a disadvantaged third-party group, even when the in-group is not involved as the perpetrator. Thomas and McGarty (2009) in particular have argued that moral outrage is directed easily at a third party or even a system of inequality (Leach et al., 2002; Montada & Schneider, 1989) to motivate prosocial behavior (Lodewijkz, Kersten, & van Zomeren, 2008; Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007). For example, Thomas and McGarty (2009) induced norms of moral outrage at environmental damage in opinion-based groups and found them to significantly predict collective action intentions both to help the victims and to confront the perpetrators.

As Tam et al. (2008) pointed out, the end of overt intergroup hostility does not mean that groups coexist in harmony. Most research programs aimed at understanding how to reach this goal focus on shared identity, but several programs have focused on group-based trust and forgiveness as crucial predictors of postconflict reconciliation (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008; Tam et al., 2007, in Northern Ireland; Čehajić, Brown, & Castano, 2008, in Bosnia and Herzegovina; González, Manzi, & Noor, 2011, in post-Pinochet Chile). Trust and forgiveness are related to reconciliation-facilitating behaviors, such as approach rather than avoidance, wishing the other well, and decreases in desire for retribution (American Psychological Association, 2006). Notably, out-group trust has been shown to be more important than out-group liking for predicting intergroup behavior (Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy, & Cairns, 2009).

These programs of research have examined group-based emotional determinants of forgiveness and trust on the assumption that these prosocial orientations, like behavioral reconciliation itself, require changes in each group's emotions toward the other (Nadler, Malloy, & Fischer, 2008). Once again, the primary categorization-based emotional culprit has proven to be anger or related emotions such as hostility and resentment, rather than other negative emotions, such as fear and disgust. In two studies, Tam et al. (2008) showed that out-group anger (together with infrahumanization) decreased intergroup forgiveness in Northern Ireland and that intergroup contact that reduced anger toward the out-group increased forgiveness. Two other studies have found that empathy toward the out-group similarly increases forgiveness and trust (Čehajić et al., 2008; Noor et al., 2008), but as noted earlier, it is not clear whether empathy as measured in these studies is a group-level emotion.

One widely accepted means of repairing broken interpersonal relationships is apology, and there is a growing literature on the impact of intergroup apology. According to Nadler et al. (2008), apology promotes forgiveness, which in turns opens the way for reconciliation. Consistent with this view, Brown, Wohl, and Exline (2008) demonstrated that intergroup apologies in response to a supposed accidental transgression attenuated the victimized group's desire for revenge and avoidance motives. In contrast, Philpot and Hornsey (2008) found that although apologies bred more satisfaction on the part of the aggrieved group, they did not bring about forgiveness of the offending group. Given this mixed evidence, the focus of research has shifted to what makes an intergroup apology effective. Leonard, Mackie, and Smith (2011) recently demonstrated that the effect of apology on both intergroup forgiveness and the desire for retribution was mediated by out-group-directed emotions. We examined both negative (anger and fear) and positive (respect and satisfaction) emotions toward the transgressing out-group. Consistent with the established role of group-based anger, we found that apology reduced the desire for retribution, and out-group-directed anger uniquely mediated this effect. At the same time, however, we found that apology increased forgiveness, but that out-group-directed respect mediated this effect. This finding also adds to a growing interest in the reconciliation benefits of

increasing positive emotions, such as respect, rather than merely decreasing emotions, such as anger (Fredrickson, 2001; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Seger et al., 2011).

Another factor that may influence the effectiveness of intergroup apologies is which emotions the apologizing group expresses. Remorse appears to play a primary role (Nadler et al., 2008), although even the perception that the offending group is remorseful is not always sufficient to bring about forgiveness (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008). More recently, Wohl, Hornsey, and Bennett (2012) drew on the infrahumanization literature to argue that only groups perceived as expressing secondary emotions (complex, uniquely human emotions like anguish and remorse) would be forgiven following an apology, whereas groups perceived as feeling only primary emotions (such as fear) would not. Four studies supported their hypothesis, demonstrating that forgiveness was reduced when primary rather than secondary emotions were expressed in out-group but not in-group apologies, and only among those who denied uniquely human qualities to the out-group. In addition to underscoring the role of group-based emotions in reconciliation processes, this work points to the importance of perceiving the out-group's group-based emotions, an issue to which we return later.

The evidence thus suggests that group-based emotions play a crucial role not only in the darker side of intergroup relations but also in the processes through which prejudice can be reduced, transgressions can be redressed, relationships can be repaired, and intergroup interactions can move toward harmony and mutual good will. The relative recency of many of these findings testifies that it is a rapidly growing area of research interest, with many promising future theoretical developments and practical interventions.

NEW DIRECTIONS

This section suggests several important new and emerging directions for research examining intergroup emotions, their causes, and their consequences.

Nature of Membership Groups

Existing work on intergroup emotions focuses mostly on social categories, such as university, national, ethnic, gender, or political party groups, although a very few studies have examined attitudinally defined groups (e.g., people who oppose capital punishment; Mackie et al., 2000) and work groups (Tiedens, Sutton, & Fong, 2004). This research emphasis means that emotions based in some types of group memberships have been virtually ignored. Lickel et al. (2000) have found evidence for four types of groups. Social categories such as those listed earlier are large and semipermanent; their members do not necessarily interact face to face as groups, and the groups are generally difficult to enter or exit. Task groups such as committees or juries are relatively small, interact face to face, and often exist only for a limited time. Intimacy groups such as families or a circle of close friends are small, interact face to face, and are long lasting and difficult to enter or exit. Finally, loose associations, such as a number of people waiting in line, are transient and bound only by their temporarily shared circumstances. Social identity theory and self-categorization theory both maintain that people can identify with meaningful groups of any type (although perhaps not loose associations), but research under these theories also has tended to focus more on social categories. Therefore, one important new direction is to examine the intergroup emotion consequences of people's self-categorization and identification as members of task and intimacy groups in particular.

This concern motivated us (Banerji et al., 2011) to ask people to think about intimate, task, social category, and loose associations of which they might be part and to report the emotions that they felt when doing so. The results were remarkable in their consistency: Across social category, intimacy, or task groups, people reported emotions that were typically distinct from their individual emotions, different depending on their categorization, and correlated with their identification with the group. Thus, across all types of meaningful groups, the processes underlying the emotions triggered by group belonging appeared to be similar, and the fact that identification related to emotional intensity

confirmed that group-level processes were at play when people focused on these different kinds of memberships. In contrast, although being part of a loose association triggered considerable sharing of emotions, there was no evidence for identification with the association affecting the intensity of emotions. This is exactly what might be expected if emotion sharing in loose associations came about because of exposure to a common situation (and one another) rather than because of group membership itself.

The finding that group-based emotions operate similarly in work or task groups confirms the benefit of applying an IET analysis to organizations (Garcia-Prieto et al., 2007). Here we distinguish interacting task groups, such as the workers in a particular office or a management committee, from broader, social category-like groups such as "employees of Ford Motor Co." The group-based emotions that result from identification with task groups are likely to affect both relationship and task aspects of work-group life (Garcia-Prieto et al., 2007). On the relationship front, group-based emotions might influence citizenship behaviors, cohesion, conflict, satisfaction, and organizational longevity (Garcia-Prieto, Bellard, & Schneider, 2003; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). On the task front, group-based emotions also may affect the ways in which these groups actually go about their tasks, such as inter-pretation of and reaction to strategic issues, generat-ing ideas, sharing information, making decisions, and resolving task conflicts, as has been shown for the contagion-based affect that can create a shared mood within task groups (Kelly & Barsade, 2001; Jones & Kelly, 2009).

The fact that group-based emotions exhibited similar patterns in intimacy groups and in social cat-egory and work groups suggests multiple avenues for theoretical extension and integration. Lickel et al. (2000) found that members of intimacy groups reported the highest levels of group identification. This finding suggests that intimacy group-based emotions might be particularly frequent and intense and thus especially powerful facilitators of a wide range of behaviors. In addition, the groups encom-passed by the intimacy classification include groups that tend to be both enduring and powerful, and

thus emotions tied to membership in such groups are likely to be enduring and powerful. The fact that family and friendship groups appeared to generate group-based emotions in similar ways suggests links to many other findings and literatures. For example, family and kin groups are attributed causal signifi-cance in extreme prosocial and altruistic behaviors. Swann, Gamez, Dovidio, Hart, and Jetten (2010) have suggested that identification with a group per-ceived as having familial ties allows extreme self-sacrificial acts on behalf of the group, such as suicide bombings or throwing oneself on the tracks to stop a train that otherwise will kill in-group members. We expect that specific emotions (directed to either or both in-group and out-group) likely will mediate the relation between kin group belonging and altruism, and thus they may provide an avenue of facilitation or disruption of such behavior.

Extending a group-based analysis of emotions to intimacy groups such as romantic couples provides a potential link to the literature on close relation-ships. Because people can identify with an intimacy group such as a romantic couple, it follows that they can appraise events and objects in terms of how they affect the couple, triggering relationship-based happiness, anxiety, pride, or disappointment, for example. These couple- or dyad-level emotions are distinct from the individual emotions that one may feel in a relationship (e.g., anger at one's partner) and also from more cognitive or evaluative judg-ments, such as relationship satisfaction or intimacy. This link suggests that relationship-related behavior often may be motivated by relationship-based emo-tions. Such an analysis could provide a new perspec-tive on emotions that commonly are studied in the context of relationships, such as love and jealousy, as well as on relationship-sustaining behaviors, such as social support provision, and relationship-eroding behaviors, such as violence.

Interplay of Interpersonal Relations and Group Memberships

The social identity tradition (and theories about prejudice based on it, including IET) deemphasizes the role of specific interpersonal relationships in favor of more abstract beliefs about norms (including

emotion norms) that characterize groups as a whole. Group spokespeople or leaders, or individuals perceived as especially prototypical of the group (Hogg, 2001; Hogg & Hardie, 1992), will be particularly influential in shaping group members' behavior, but this influence is based on their being seen as good representatives of the group rather than on their relationships to particular group members. In contrast, other research has demonstrated the greater impact of specific interpersonal relationships and specific interactions for prejudice (Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001; Lyons & Kashima, 2003), including the importance of cross-group friendships for prejudice reduction (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). These findings suggest that any individual group member's feelings about an out-group may be especially influenced by those with whom the individual is tied through relationships and interaction. These kinds of effects may be best understood by applying the social network approach.

Proponents of this approach (Katz, Lazer, Arrow, & Contractor, 2004; Wasserman & Faust, 1994) attempt to understand social phenomena as a function of who people interact with and how they do so. Social networks are structures made up of "nodes" or social entities interconnected by "links" representing specific types of social relationships that constrain and direct interactions. Thus, a social network summarizes both the structure of individuals' long-term important relationships as well as the likelihood of short-term immediate interactions. Both aspects of network structure and the nature of interaction can lead to convergence of attitudes, emotions, or behavior within the network (Mason, Conrey, & Smith, 2007). Because network approaches highlight the importance of the frequency, recency, and quality of interpersonal interactions and relationships, they emphasize processes and factors contributing to shared emotion that are quite different from those emphasized by categorization approaches. For example, network approaches do not assume any special preference for or influence from the in-group. Networks often link individuals to and shape interaction with a diverse set of others, including members of out-groups. In addition, network considerations make it clear that face-to-face groups, such as task groups and families, afford much more frequent interindividual interactions compared with the abstract social categories more often studied in categorization approaches. This suggests that in different circumstances or with different kinds of groups, categorization-based processes, network-based processes, or both might generate shared emotions and thus affect intergroup behavior. For example, Niedenthal and Brauer (2012) distinguished between the group-based emotions caused by identification and the group emotions contributed to by contagion processes generated by concrete interaction with specific others (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). In any given concrete situation, for example, the decision to confront a transgressor group could be based on emotion brought about by identification or by the presence of others expressing the same emotion. The specification of how group-based and interaction-based processes work either independently or together to produce shared emotion toward other groups relies on an integration of category and network approaches and remains a highly significant new direction for research on intergroup emotions.

Cultural Differences

As with many other psychological topics, the great majority of work on intergroup emotions has been conducted in North American and Western European cultural contexts. It is important, however, to examine intergroup emotions in other cultural contexts as well. Indeed, given the considerable research on individual emotions that has shown both similarities and differences across cultures (e.g., Mesquita & Frijda, 1992), it seems reasonable to assume that there might be cultural similarities and differences in both what group-based emotions are felt and how they are felt. For example, one consistent finding is that members of independent cultures tend to report relatively more positive than negative emotions compared with members of interdependent cultures (e.g., Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000; Mesquita & Karasawa, 2002; Scollon, Diener, Oishi, & Biswas-Diener, 2004). In addition, Kitayama, Mesquita, and Karasawa (2006) argued that members of independent cultures experience more disengaging or distancing emotions than members of interdependent cultures, in which

promoting and maintaining relationships is paramount. Although group emotions might be expected to parallel individual emotions, the target of the group-based emotions should be taken into account. Many of the cultural differences in emotions have been attributed to the need to maintain cohesion in interdependent cultures. Thus, closeness-promoting group-based emotions toward the in-group, but more distancing emotions toward the out-group, might be predicted. Because members of interdependent cultures are assumed to be more deeply embedded in group memberships, there may be less distinctiveness between individual and group emotions in such cultures.

As regards when and how emotion might be experienced, members of interdependent cultures have been shown to experience emotion more closely tied to concrete situations of interaction (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Masuda et al., 2008), suggesting that their group-based emotions might differ when they think about themselves as members of face-to-face groups rather than abstract social categories or when they imagine experiencing emotion on behalf of a group in a concrete situation rather than in general. Moreover, from a group-based emotion perspective, these differences are assumed to be rooted in different group-based appraisals of events. Consistent with that idea and moving beyond the independent–interdependent distinction, Leung and Cohen (2011) distinguished among honor, face, and dignity cultures and in particular pointed to differences in whether and how members of such cultures appraise and react to threats. Such appraisal differences have obvious implications for the quality and quantity of emotion that might be generated in members of such cultures. Research to date has not investigated whether these patterns of cultural differences extend to the case of intergroup as well as individual-level emotions, but such comparisons promise to advance our understanding not only of intergroup relations but also of emotion and culture.

Nature of Group Identification

Group identification is the psychological tie between an individual and a group to which he or she belongs (Leach et al., 2008). This construct, however, has been defined and measured in many ways in the research literature. Although it often has been assumed to be unidimensional, more recent work has sought to identify multiple (probably correlated) dimensions (Jackson & Smith, 1999; Leach et al., 2008; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Importantly, these dimensions may have different relationships to intergroup emotions. Across individuals, the fundamental processes of self-categorization and depersonalization may occur to different extents. These processes may occur more fully for those for whom the group membership is more central to the self, or they may have greater consequences for emotion among individuals for whom the group membership is more affectively laden or important for identity (Mackie et al., 2009). This distinction has some similarity to the one between the implications of importance (how much I view the group as part of who I am) and commitment (how much I want to benefit the group) emphasized by Roccas et al. (2008). Other hypotheses follow from idealization of the group, termed *superiority* in Roccas et al.'s (2008) model. Whereas people high on the importance dimension of identification are likely to experience both positive and negative emotions on behalf of their groups, those who are high on superiority may be very unlikely to experience negative emotions because those would call into question the perception of the group as unequivocally positive, moral, successful, and so forth.

Finally, the distinction (mentioned earlier) between thinking of groups as categories versus social networks of relationships and interaction may create and promote different types of affective ties to a group. Some people may feel a bond with the symbolic meaning of a group as a whole, whereas others are tied to the group through their relationships with individual group members (e.g., Brewer & Gardner, 1996). These different types of bond to a group could have different effects on intergroup emotions. For example, they could influence whether people appraise events in terms of their implications for the group versus for specific other group members. They could shape whether people's emotions are influenced primarily by group emotion norms (as represented by specific group members seen as prototypical) or by the emotions of specific other group members with whom they have close ties.

Emotion Directed Toward the In-Group

In addition to events and out-groups, the IET approach has placed equal importance on emotions directed toward the in-group. Just as events and out-groups are appraised for their potential effects on the material resources, physical well-being, and social standing of the in-group, and just as those appraisals trigger emotions that motivate behavior, the same processes are at play for emotions directed toward the in-group. In-group traits, behavior, and status or standing also are appraised for their consequences for the group, trigger emotions, and motivate behavior. Group-based guilt is one of the best-researched examples; members of groups responsible for either historical or contemporary transgressions feel guilt not only about the events but also about qualities of the in-group that might have precipitated such events. As described earlier, anger certainly can be directed at the in-group, both because of its actions and its inactions; for similar reasons, in-group actions can result in satisfaction, pride, and disappointment being aimed at the in-group. Over time, such emotions, perhaps originally based on the appraisals of behavior, can be associated chronically with the in-group. What are the effects when activating in-group membership reliably triggers and is accompanied by pride in the in-group, love for the in-group, guilt or shame about the in-group, or anger and disgust at the in-group? Are different group memberships marked by different characteristic emotions associated with the in-group? If so, many interesting research questions can be raised. First, do different in-group-directed emotions make particular repertoires of behavior more likely? Whereas most of the research focuses on out-group-directed emotions promoting out-group-directed behavior, which in-group-directed emotions facilitate particular kinds of intergroup behavior? Does in-group-directed guilt or shame make defensiveness, withdrawal, or submission more likely? Does in-group pride or in-group love encourage not only in-group affiliative behaviors but also extreme sacrifice for the good of the group or extreme aggression against other groups?

Second, different emotions directed toward the group based on group-level concerns also might be related closely to group members' emotional ties to the group. An individual member of an in-group whose qualities, standing, or actions generate admiration and respect might be tied strongly to the group by these emotions. As we noted, identification with groups traditionally has been characterized as involving multiple dimensions, one of which is importance or emotional significance. Perhaps the emotional significance of group membership could be differentiated as regards the nature of various emotional ties between members and group, providing a possible integration of group-based emotion (emotions because of group membership), group emotion (emotion experienced because of the presence of fellow group members), and individual emotions about group belonging.

Understanding an Out-Group's Intergroup Emotions

In many intergroup situations (whether cooperation or conflict), it becomes important to understand the intergroup emotions felt by an out-group. Are they angry at the in-group, proud of their own group, or disappointed in their limited accomplishments? Such an understanding is crucial because (as we have argued throughout this chapter) an out-group's emotions will directly influence their intergroup actions, such as aggression or cooperation. One set of studies (Seger et al., 2009) examined the extent to which people could understand an out-group's general group-based emotions (e.g., men guessing how women felt as women; Democrats guessing how Republicans feel as members of their party). Results showed considerable accuracy, although there was also some projection of the in-group's group-based emotions onto the out-group (i.e., people assumed that the out-group felt somewhat similar to the way the in-group felt). But coexisting with this limited accuracy was an evaluative in-group-favoring bias: People thought that out-group members experienced more negative emotions, and less positive emotions, than their in-group. These initial investigations only scratch the surface of intriguing research questions about understanding an out-group's emotions. Will people be accurate when predicting an out-group's emotional response to a specific situation (e.g., to an episode of intergroup conflict) rather than just the general emotions

studied by Seger et al. (2009)? Is an accurate understanding of an out-group's emotions conceptually related to intergroup empathy, and does it have positive consequences for prejudice reduction or intergroup reconciliation? How will the perception of group-based emotion be influenced by well-established emotional stereotypes? For example, whereas in-group members are believed to feel a wide range of subtle, social, and complex emotions, such as regret, compassion, and anguish, out-group members are more likely to be attributed only nonuniquely human or primary emotions, such as fear and anger (Leyens et al., 2000). Such dehumanizing biases seem likely to lead to systematic errors of group-based emotion prediction and thus of behavior prediction. Similarly, group stereotypes about emotion influence both out-group and in-group members' predictions of emotional reactions. In one study, men were predicted to be more angry and women more sad in response to negative performance feedback, and these predictions in turn influenced participants' willingness to deliver the feedback (Moons & Mackie, 2006). Beyond the role of emotional stereotyping, it will be important to understand the role of such factors as group-level actor-observer biases, focusing on the causal event rather than the entire context, and relations of power and status among groups in this process. Such issues have yet to be investigated systematically but illustrate one of the many ways in which research on group-based emotions are likely to further contribute to the study of intergroup relations.

CONCLUSION

The wide range and prolific amount of research cited in this chapter speaks to the thoroughgoing influence that conceptions of group-based emotion have had on theorizing about intergroup relations. From E. R. Smith's (1993) original insight that self-categorization imbued group events with the self-relevance that is a necessary condition for emotion, we and others have developed the conception of emotion as a truly group-level rather than just an individual-level phenomenon. Emotion in this view is a product of social identity, generated by an evaluation or recognition of the relevance of objects and events for the particular

conception of self that is currently salient. In support of this idea, we have described research showing that activation of a distinct social group membership results in emotions quite different from those experienced as an individual and quite different from those experienced when thinking of oneself as a member of a different group, even in the face of the same objects and events. This group-based emotional experience typically is rooted in appraisal of the consequences of those objects and events for the activated group identity, rather than for a purely individual self. Moreover, the scope and intensity of the group-based emotions experienced depend on the extent of identification with the group.

The generativity of categorization-based emotion approaches can be attributed partially to the fact that they imply a more nuanced view of preference for in-groups and prejudice against out-groups than more traditional evaluation-based notions as well as the fact that they privilege prediction of group-based or collective behavior. The consequences of group-based emotion for both positive and negative intergroup behavior continue to be documented. We have reviewed research showing the well-established role of group-based anger, as well as the ongoing investigation of other group-based emotions, in intergroup conflict and violence. Other research demonstrates the power of categorization-based emotions to undermine prejudice and to repair and restore interactions between groups. Perhaps particularly noteworthy among these studies is research revealing the group-based emotions that allow one group to intervene on behalf not just of the in-group but of other victimized groups. Finally, we suggest several ways in which the current work on categorization-based emotions can be further extended and integrated. Within intergroup relations, theorizing and research about group-based emotions is raising new questions about intergroup perception, the meaning of group membership, and the nature of the bonds between group members and groups. Beyond intergroup relations, the group-based emotion approach seems poised to make contributions to our understanding of close and intimate relationships, of organizational behavior, and of culture. We intend our review to facilitate and promote this process.

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